

PERFORMANCE AUDIT
OF THE
STANDISH MAXIMUM SECURITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
AND CAMP LEHMAN

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

October 1999

EXECUTIVE DIGEST

STANDISH MAXIMUM SECURITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND CAMP LEHMAN

INTRODUCTION

This report, issued in October 1999, contains the results of our performance audit* of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF) and Camp Lehman (CL), Department of Corrections (DOC).

AUDIT PURPOSE

This performance audit was conducted as part of the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Auditor General. Performance audits are conducted on a priority basis related to the potential for improving effectiveness* and efficiency*.

BACKGROUND

SMSCF, located in Arenac County, and CL, located in Crawford County, are under the jurisdiction of DOC. The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is appointed by the DOC director.

The mission* of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. SMSCF, which opened in April 1990, is a maximum security (level V)* facility for males, with a

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

capacity of 518 prisoners. Prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, fenced perimeter. CL, which was placed under the jurisdiction of SMSCF in August 1997, has a capacity of 342 minimum security (level I)* male prisoners within a fenced perimeter.

For fiscal year 1997-98, SMSCF and CL operating expenditures were approximately \$21.3 million and \$5.7 million, respectively. As of March 1, 1999, SMSCF and CL had 341 and 84 employees, respectively.

AUDIT OBJECTIVES,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
NOTEWORTHY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations were generally effective in preventing escapes and protecting employees and prisoners from serious injury. However, we noted reportable conditions* related to security threat group (STG) prisoners*, arsenal operations, concealed weapon permits and firearms qualifications, employee searches, weekly security inspections, security, safety plans, and community liaison (Findings 1 through 8).

Noteworthy Accomplishments: SMSCF has been reaccredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections of the American Correctional Association. Also, CL prisoner public work crews were recognized for their efforts in assisting the City of Gaylord in cleaning up serious damage after a May 1998 storm. Further, we were informed that various police agencies have commented that the security staff at SMSCF and CL have

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

obtained information through STG monitoring which has proven valuable in various law enforcement investigations.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that SMSCF's and CL's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to consolidation of prison operations and meal production (Findings 9 and 10).

AUDIT SCOPE AND
METHODOLOGY

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility and Camp Lehman. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Our audit procedures included examination of SMSCF and CL records and activities for the period October 1996 through February 1999. Our audit methodology included a preliminary review of SMSCF and CL operations. This included discussions with various SMSCF and CL staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and review of program records and DOC policy directives and SMSCF and CL operating procedures. To gain an understanding of SMSCF and CL activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures in an

effective and efficient manner. In addition, we developed a survey requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

AGENCY RESPONSES

Our audit report includes 10 findings and 11 recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated that SMSCF partially or fully agrees with and has complied or has taken action to comply with the 11 recommendations.

Mr. Bill Martin, Director
Department of Corrections
Grandview Plaza
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility and Camp Lehman, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our executive digest; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; description of survey and summary of survey responses, presented as supplemental information; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

AUDITOR GENERAL

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Description of Agency

The Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF), located in Arenac County, and Camp Lehman (CL), located in Crawford County, are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (DOC). The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is a classified State employee under the State's civil service system. The warden is appointed by the DOC director.

The two facilities share a records office, a personnel office, and a training office. The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees the business office, physical plant, fire safety, warehouse, and food service operations.

The mission of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. SMSCF, which opened in April 1990, is a maximum security (level V) facility for males, with a capacity of 518 prisoners. Prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, five gun towers that are staffed 24 hours per day, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols the facility perimeter. CL, which was placed under the jurisdiction of SMSCF in August 1997, has a capacity of 342 minimum security (level I) male prisoners within a fenced perimeter.

For fiscal year 1997-98, SMSCF and CL operating expenditures were approximately \$21.3 million and \$5.7 million, respectively. As of March 1, 1999, SMSCF and CL had 341 and 84 employees, respectively.

Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses

Audit Objectives

Our performance audit of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF) and Camp Lehman (CL), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations.
2. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility and Camp Lehman. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures were conducted during December 1998 through April 1999 and included examination of SMSCF and CL records and activities for the period October 1996 through February 1999.

To establish our audit objectives and to gain an understanding of SMSCF and CL activities, we conducted a preliminary review of SMSCF and CL operations. This included discussions with various SMSCF and CL staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and review of program records and DOC policy directives and SMSCF and CL operating procedures. To gain an understanding of SMSCF and CL activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures in an effective and efficient manner.

To assess the effectiveness of SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations, we conducted tests of records related to firearms inventories and employee firearm qualifications at SMSCF. We also examined records related to prisoner and cell searches and employee searches. On a test basis, we inventoried keys and critical and dangerous tools. In addition, we reviewed visitor safety, telephone monitoring systems, and documentation of items taken into and out of the facilities.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF and CL prisoner and maintenance operations, we conducted tests of records and reviewed preventive maintenance, disaster management, inventory controls, fire safety procedures, emergency backup tests, food service operations, prisoner care, and cash receipts. Also, we analyzed prisoner store financial information and inventory controls and reviewed controls over the prisoner funds accounting system.

In addition, we developed a survey (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

Agency Responses

Our audit report includes 10 findings and 11 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated that SMSCF partially or fully agrees with and has complied or has taken action to comply with the 11 recommendations.

The agency preliminary response which follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

SAFETY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF) and Camp Lehman (CL) operate under the policy directives established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as well as operating procedures that are developed at each facility. SMSCF and CL are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. SMSCF operates within a secured, electronically monitored, double-fenced perimeter that includes five gun towers that are staffed around the clock with perimeter patrols by an alert response vehicle. CL is a minimum security prison camp surrounded by a fence. DOC policy directives and local operating procedures have been implemented to help ensure the security of keys, tools, and firearms. SMSCF and CL staff conduct periodic searches of prisoners, housing units, and prisoner belongings to detect contraband* . All visitors must register when entering the facilities and are subject to search. DOC policy directives provide for periodic random searches of employees entering and exiting the facilities.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that SMSCF's and CL's safety and security operations were generally effective in preventing escapes and protecting employees and prisoners from serious injury. However, we noted reportable conditions related to security threat group (STG) prisoners, arsenal operations, concealed weapon permits and firearms qualifications, employee searches, weekly security inspections, security, safety plans, and community liaison.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

Noteworthy Accomplishments: SMSCF has been reaccredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections of the American Correctional Association. Also, CL prisoner public work crews were recognized for their efforts in assisting the City of Gaylord in cleaning up serious damage after a May 1998 storm. Further, we were informed that various police agencies have commented that the security staff at SMSCF and CL have obtained information through STG monitoring which has proven valuable in various law enforcement investigations for DOC and various law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids Police Departments.

FINDING

1. STG Prisoners

SMSCF did not ensure that custody staff* complied with DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures regarding visits and time spent outside cells by STG prisoners.

DOC classifies certain prisoners as a threat to the safety and security of the facility because of gang-related activities or affiliations. Isolation of these prisoners is necessary to help monitor gang-related activities; to prevent violence; to ensure the overall security of the facility; and to help prevent the introduction of contraband, escape plots, and violence related to "turf disputes," debt collection, and other STG-influenced activities.

STG prisoners possess characteristics which pose a threat to staff and other prisoners. Known leaders of gangs or groups who pose a threat to staff or other prisoners or to the custody and security of the facility are classified as STG II prisoners* . All STG II prisoners must be housed in a maximum security (level V) or higher facility, except when specifically approved by the deputy director for correctional facilities administration.

DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures limit STG II prisoners to two 60-minute noncontact visits per month (except for lawyers and clergy). STG II prisoners are allowed out of their cells for a maximum of 60 minutes each day in

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

addition to attorney and clergy visits, meals, showers, work and school assignments, law library, and religious services.

Our review of visiting and housing unit records disclosed:

- a. SMSCF did not always limit STG II prisoner visits to 60 minutes as required by policy directives. Visitation records for 11 STG II prisoners for the 13-month period ended February 12, 1999 showed that 28 (61%) of 46 visits exceeded 60 minutes in duration, including 6 visits between 60 minutes and 90 minutes, 14 visits between 90 minutes and 120 minutes, and 8 visits which were greater than 120 minutes in duration. Also, we could not determine the duration of 9 (20%) visits because staff did not record the length of visits.
- b. SMSCF did not monitor movement of STG II prisoners to help ensure that contact with staff and other prisoners was limited as required by policy directives. Segregation units documented that the STG II prisoners participated in various activities but did not document all of the time that these prisoners spent outside their cells. Also, SMSCF had not developed a method to track the out-of-cell activities for STG II prisoners housed in general population cells. Thus, we could not determine to what extent SMSCF staff complied with DOC policy directives limiting out-of-cell activities of STG II prisoners.

Limiting visits and monitoring internal movement of STG II prisoners could reduce the ability of these prisoners to compromise the safety of staff and other prisoners and the security of the facility.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that custody staff comply with DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures regarding visits and time spent outside cells by STG prisoners.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that it has complied by requiring staff to submit documentation regarding out-of-cell movement to the STG coordinator on a weekly basis.

FINDING

2. Arsenal Operations

SMSCF did not comply with certain DOC policy directives, SMSCF operating procedures, and arsenal controls established to help ensure public safety and facility security.

DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures recommend minimum inventory levels of service ammunition for the arsenal, require verification of firearm inventories semiannually with the business office, and require the facility to register all firearms annually with the Michigan Department of State Police (MSP).

Our review of arsenal operations disclosed:

- a. The SMSCF arsenal did not maintain the quantity of ammunition recommended by the DOC Ordnance Manual. As of January 27, 1999, SMSCF had only 27% of the recommended quantity of ammunition for its handguns. The DOC Ordnance Manual recommends that the facility maintain an inventory of at least 50 rounds per firearm at all times.
- b. The SMSCF business office could not provide documentation that it had ever completed a semiannual inventory of the arsenal as required by SMSCF operating procedures.
- c. The SMSCF arsenal did not register all firearms annually with MSP. The last registration occurred in September 1994. There have been significant changes to the inventory since 1994. These included the purchase of 31 handguns and shotguns and 5 rifles for the emergency response team* (ERT) that was established in 1998.

Maintaining required ammunition levels helps ensure that sufficient ammunition is available in an emergency. Independent verification of firearm inventories and annually registering all firearms with MSP help to ensure that firearms are accounted for and that the public is protected.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF comply with DOC policy directives, SMSCF operating procedures, and arsenal controls established to help ensure public safety and facility security.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. SMSCF had sufficient ammunition to ensure that each firearm had an adequate supply. At the time of the audit, ammunition was on order, but had not yet arrived. Although SMSCF regularly orders ammunition to ensure compliance with the DOC Ordnance Manual guidelines, its inventory may occasionally slip below recommended levels while waiting for the order to arrive.

SMSCF informed us that it has completed an inventory and registered its firearms with MSP. SMSCF will ensure future compliance with DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures regarding arsenal operations.

FINDING

3. Concealed Weapon Permits and Firearms Qualifications

SMSCF did not ensure that all ERT members possessed valid permits to carry a concealed weapon and that all custody officers were annually recertified in the use of firearms required for their positions.

The DOC Ordnance Manual requires all members of the ERT to carry a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon at all times. Also, DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures require that various custody officers must be annually recertified in the use of handguns, shotguns, or rifles prior to being issued these firearms. Custody officers who may be assigned to a mobilization squad, the ERT, a tower, the perimeter security vehicle, or a transportation detail must be annually recertified in the use of the firearms assigned to those details.

Our review of custody training records and work assignments disclosed:

- a. Five (16%) of the 31 members of the ERT did not possess a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon for ERT assignments between January 2, 1999 and January 17, 1999.
- b. Shift commanders assigned four custody officers to eight assignments that could have required the use of a firearm for which the officers had not been annually recertified to use between December 15, 1998 and December 31, 1998.

Proper maintenance of concealed weapon permits and firearm certifications for all assignments is essential to help ensure the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that all ERT members possess valid permits to carry a concealed weapon and that all custody officers are annually recertified in the use of firearms required for their positions.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and will comply. DOC informed us that it will evaluate whether to extend the concealed weapon permit validation period from the current one year to three years to be consistent with validation periods extended by other law enforcement agencies. Also, SMSCF informed us that it has ensured that staff assigned to squads have current firearm certifications. It should be noted that the officers' certifications were expired by no more than 14 days.

FINDING

4. Employee Searches

SMSCF did not ensure that each employee entering the SMSCF and CL security perimeter areas was subject to a random search.

DOC policy directives and SMSCF operating procedures do not specify a frequency for employee searches and have not designated methods to ensure random selection of employees for a search.

Our review of SMSCF and CL employee searches disclosed that custody staff did not periodically search employees entering the security perimeter:

- a. Custody staff at SMSCF performed 839 employee pat-down searches in November 1998. However, 89 (34%) of 262 SMSCF custody officers who routinely entered the security perimeter area on a daily basis were not searched during the month. Also, 37 (56%) of 66 administrative, food service, and medical staff who regularly work within the security perimeter area were not searched during the month.
- b. Custody staff at CL did not search 29 (37%) of 78 employees in December 1998 and 30 (38%) of 78 employees in January 1999. At CL, all employees routinely enter the security perimeter.

Periodic random searches of employees who routinely work inside the security perimeter can be an effective deterrent to contraband entering the security perimeter.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that each employee entering the security perimeter areas at SMSCF and CL is subject to a random search.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

DOC agrees and informed us that it plans to change its policy directive to require random clothed body searches of employees based on computer-generated random samples.

FINDING

5. Weekly Security Inspections

SMSCF did not ensure that weekly security inspections were completed.

SMSCF operating procedures require that custody staff complete weekly security inspections to determine whether bars, locks, windows, doors, gates, and other security devices are fully operational. If defects or malfunctions are discovered, custody staff are required to forward a maintenance service request to the deputy warden.

For the 60-week period ended February 27, 1999, 48 (80%) of the 60 weekly inspections were not completed.

Failure to identify weaknesses in security devices in a timely manner could compromise the security of the facility and the safety of staff, prisoners, and the public.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF establish controls to ensure that weekly security inspections are completed.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that it has complied by taking appropriate corrective action with staff who are responsible for ensuring that the reports are completed.

FINDING

6. Security

SMSCF did not ensure that CL complied with DOC policy directives requiring cell searches, random monitoring of prisoner telephone calls, screening for members

of STGs, and security screening of visitors. Also, SMSCF did not ensure that CL monitored the use of gate manifests* to control the movement of items into and out of the camp.

DOC policy directives require prisons and camps to establish various systems to help ensure that security is not compromised. For example, policy directives require custody officers to complete a minimum number of cell searches, conduct random monitoring of prisoner telephone calls, monitor for prisoners involved in STGs, and screen visitors with metal detectors. In addition, SMSCF operating procedure requires staff to use gate manifests to control the movement of supplies, materials, and equipment into and out of the security perimeter. Custody staff who routinely carry specific items into the security perimeter are issued a permanent gate manifest.

Our review of security measures at CL disclosed:

- a. Custody staff did not complete all required cell searches. For the four-month period ended February 28, 1999, we noted that staff from 2 randomly selected housing units did not complete 161 (11%) of the 1,440 required cell searches.
- b. Custody staff did not monitor telephone activities during the period December 1998 through February 1999. Also, custody staff could not locate telephone monitoring logs to show that monitoring had occurred prior to December 1998.
- c. Custody staff did not follow up on possible gang-related activities identified by CL staff to determine whether prisoners should be reported as a member of an STG. For example, in April 1998, custody staff identified 10 potential gang members. Based on our review of 4 of the 10 prisoners, there was no evidence in the prisoner files that staff had completed additional screening to determine whether these prisoners were STG members.
- d. Custody staff did not search visitors with hand-held metal detectors, which are available at CL.

* See glossary at end of report for definition

- e. Custody staff did not use gate manifests and permanent gate manifests to track items brought into and removed from the camp. CL did not establish a procedure outlining when gate manifests and permanent gate manifests should be used and who is responsible for issuing, approving, and accounting for these documents. At the time of our review, gate manifests were not controlled or reconciled.

We were informed that CL was unable to maintain some of the preceding security systems because of reduced custody staffing caused by extended sick leave. Because of reduced staff availability, CL eliminated certain security monitoring activities, including telephone monitoring and STG monitoring.

Failure to implement the required security measures could compromise the security of staff, prisoners, and visitors to the camp.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that CL complies with DOC policy directives requiring cell searches, random monitoring of prisoner telephone calls, screening for members of STGs, and security screening of visitors.

We also recommend that SMSCF ensure that CL monitors the use of gate manifests to control the movement of items into and out of the camp.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. SMSCF informed us that it issued a new operating procedure for cell searches and for telephone monitoring at CL. Also, SMSCF has assigned an STG coordinator at CL. Although CL was performing clothed body searches of visitors, CL has begun utilizing hand-held detectors on visitors. Even though policy directives do not require CL to utilize gate manifests, CL will implement their use.

FINDING

7. Safety Plans

SMSCF did not ensure that CL had a comprehensive, up-to-date disaster management plan and fire safety operations plan.

DOC policy directives require that all prison facilities develop a disaster management plan and fire safety operations plan. Such safety plans help protect employees and prisoners from potentially hazardous conditions and safety risks.

Our review of CL operations indicated that CL safety plans need to be revised and updated. Although CL had developed a disaster management plan and fire safety operations plan, these safety plans were old and contained incomplete and out-of-date information, including obsolete emergency employee contacts and information relating to desired operations under the former camp program.

Development of a comprehensive, up-to-date disaster management plan and fire safety operations plan would help provide CL staff with specific guidance on how to better protect employees, prisoners, visitors, and prison property in the event of unforeseen disasters and fire emergencies.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that CL develops a comprehensive, up-to-date disaster management plan and fire safety operations plan.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that CL is in the process of updating its safety plans.

FINDING

8. Community Liaison

SMSCF did not ensure that CL established a system to help provide for timely communication with local residents who live in the vicinity of the camp.

DOC policy directives require correctional facilities to establish a system of communication with the local community for relaying DOC goals and policies, receiving and responding to community concerns and ideas, and disseminating and gathering information. The success of correctional programs can be adversely affected by the lack of public understanding and support. Also, DOC has an obligation to inform the public of its philosophy, goals, and procedures.

Our survey identified 6 (32%) of 19 respondents who live in the vicinity of CL that voiced concerns relating to the lack of communication, safety, and security issues.

Administrative responsibility for CL was transferred to SMSCF as of August 1997. When CL was under the direction of the former camp program, camps were not required to communicate with nearby residents. However, based on our survey responses, community members appeared to be interested in safety and security issues at CL. Also, consistent with DOC policy directives for correctional facilities, public interest can effectively be addressed by establishing a system of communication with CL's neighbors.

Planned and continuing public information and education programs help achieve greater community involvement, understanding, and support of the goals, purpose, and role of the facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF ensure that CL establishes a system to help provide for timely communication with local residents who live in the vicinity of the camp.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF partially agrees. SMSCF informed us that it will attempt to comply with the recommendation by establishing a separate community liaison committee for CL. However, DOC policy directives do not require camps to establish separate systems of communication with local residents as camps have been annexed to facilities.

PRISONER CARE AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: SMSCF and CL are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. SMSCF and CL have developed procedures involving preventive maintenance, disaster planning, fire safety, food service activities, power plant operations, prisoner accounting, and prisoner store operations.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of SMSCF's and CL's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that SMSCF's and CL's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to consolidation of prison operations and meal production.

FINDING

9. Consolidation of Prison Operations

SMSCF and CL had not fully integrated operations at SMSCF and CL in an effort to reduce potentially duplicative operations.

In August 1997, DOC annexed each prison camp to an existing DOC facility. CL became part of SMSCF on August 24, 1997. Combining these facilities has provided DOC with the opportunity to increase efficiency through consolidation of duplicative operations.

At the time of our review, administrative operations, fire safety, records, personnel, medical and dental care, and custody operations had been partially or fully consolidated. Based on our review of employee work assignments and outputs at SMSCF and CL, we identified areas in which additional consolidation of operations may be possible. For example, CL employs a full-time vehicle mechanic. However, the Vehicle and Travel Services, Department of Management and Budget (DMB), is responsible for maintaining and servicing all State-owned vehicles, including 1 bus, 8 trucks, and 17 vans that are assigned to CL. CL also has 2 specialty vehicles that are not part of the DMB inventory. For the fiscal year

ended September 30, 1998, CL only billed DMB approximately \$3,000 for vehicle maintenance and repairs (including reimbursement of staff time). However, the annual salary and fringe benefit costs for this employee totaled approximately \$54,600 in fiscal year 1997-98, and the prisoner workers assigned to work on these vehicles were paid approximately \$1,600. Thus, it does not appear to be cost-effective to maintain this position at CL.

In addition, CL employs two full-time maintenance mechanics and one prisoner worker who completed an average of approximately 35 work orders per month in addition to routine and preventive maintenance projects at the camp. This work load does not appear to support two full-time positions and a prisoner worker. Integration and coordination of operations at the two facilities could result in better use of staff and prisoner resources.

We did not review all areas with the possibility for consolidation. For example, in addition to vehicle maintenance and facility maintenance, the food service operations and the prisoner grievance process could be reviewed for potential improvements.

Consolidation of prison operations may permit managers to use existing staff in a more effective manner to improve the combined facilities' ability to achieve their goals and objectives in an efficient manner.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF review operations at SMSCF and CL in an effort to reduce potentially duplicative operations.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF informed us that it will continue to integrate operations at SMSCF and CL to the extent that it can. The annexation of camps to facilities is a recent change. Therefore, systematic changes to budgets, union contracts, etc., have not yet been fully negotiated and/or implemented.

FINDING

10. Meal Production

SMSCF staff did not control the number of meals forwarded to the protective custody and segregation housing units. As a result, food services overproduced approximately 1,100 meals per month.

For safety reasons, protective custody and segregation prisoners are served all meals in their housing units or designated worksites. Protective custody prisoners are assigned to work in the two segregation units as porters on an ongoing basis. Up to five porters work in each segregation unit during the periods in which meals are served. Porters are fed in the segregation unit that they are working in.

Our review of facility head counts, food production and transportation reports, and documentation of meals served for February 1999 disclosed that the number of meals delivered to the protective custody unit was not reduced for porters who were working in the segregation units. In addition, food services routinely delivered meals to the segregation units in excess of the number of prisoners housed and porters working in these units. Excess food distributed to the housing units that cannot be saved is thrown away. Based on discussions with SMSCF staff, this production schedule has been followed for several years.

Controlling the number of meals forwarded to the protective custody and segregation units could result in SMSCF reducing its food costs by approximately \$13,300 (2%) per year.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that SMSCF staff control the number of meals forwarded to the protective custody and segregation housing units.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

SMSCF agrees and informed us that it has complied by developing a method to better monitor the number of meals needed, delivered, and served.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Description of Survey

We developed a survey requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF) and Camp Lehman (CL).

We mailed surveys to 50 individuals and businesses located in the vicinity of SMSCF and received 23 responses. A review of these responses indicated that most respondents were highly satisfied with the SMSCF administration. The responses also indicated that public concerns are generally addressed in a timely manner. However, some responses identified security concerns relating to the use of the local hospital (which SMSCF was already in the process of addressing at the time of our review) and concerns relating to local improvements that were promised when the prison was first proposed but were never funded. We referred these community concerns to the warden for follow-up and provided a summary of this survey information to the warden.

We also mailed surveys to 50 individuals located in the vicinity of CL and received 19 responses. A review of the responses indicated that most respondents had no opinion regarding CL or were concerned about safety but did not know whom to contact. CL did not have a community liaison committee at the time of our survey and field visit. As noted in Finding 8, six respondents indicated a need for CL to notify the community of problems and security situations related to the camp. We referred these community concerns to the warden for follow-up and provided a summary of this survey information to the warden.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility (SMSCF)
and Camp Lehman (CL)
Summary of Survey Responses

Copies of Survey Distributed at Each Location: 50

SMSCF: Number of Responses 23 Response Rate 46%

CL: Number of Responses 19 Response Rate 38%

1. How would you rate your satisfaction with the frequency of contacts between you or your organization and the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 11	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 2	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>No Opinion</u> 4	<u>No Answer</u> 2
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 0	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>No Opinion</u> 8	<u>No Answer</u> 6

2. How satisfied are you with how management of the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman has addressed your individual concerns?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 10	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>No Opinion</u> 5	<u>No Answer</u> 2
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 0	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>No Opinion</u> 9	<u>No Answer</u> 4

3. How satisfied are you with the timeliness in which your individual concerns are addressed by the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 7	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 5	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>No Opinion</u> 7	<u>No Answer</u> 2
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 1	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>No Opinion</u> 9	<u>No Answer</u> 4

4. How satisfied are you with the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility's or Camp Lehman's process to notify the community of any problems or emergency situations related to the facility?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 9	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 7	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 0	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 3	<u>No Opinion</u> 3	<u>No Answer</u> 1
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 3	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 3	<u>No Opinion</u> 4	<u>No Answer</u> 4

5. Do you have any specific safety or security concerns that have not been addressed by Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman personnel?

SMSCF:	Yes: 4	No: 17	No Answer: 2
CL:	Yes: 3	No: 11	No Answer: 5

6. If you visited the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman, were you satisfied with the security provided to you while at the facility?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 12	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 4	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 0	<u>No Opinion</u> 3	<u>No Answer</u> 3
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 0	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 1	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 0	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 0	<u>No Opinion</u> 12	<u>No Answer</u> 6

7. Overall, how satisfied are you with the extent of communication between the Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility or Camp Lehman and the community?

SMSCF:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 11	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 6	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 1	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>No Opinion</u> 2	<u>No Answer</u> 1
CL:	<u>Highly Satisfied</u> 4	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u> 0	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u> 2	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u> 3	<u>No Opinion</u> 4	<u>No Answer</u> 6

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

CL	Camp Lehman.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility property or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
custody staff	Corrections officers and resident unit officers.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
DMB	Department of Management and Budget.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical for the amount of resources applied or minimizing the amount of resources required to attain a certain level of outputs or outcomes.
emergency response team (ERT)	A specially trained team at each prison that responds to security needs or emergencies that may arise during the day-to-day operation of the facility. These teams respond to situations that may threaten the safety of the facility or pose a threat to the community.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving the facility through the front gates and sallyport.
maximum security (level V)	A classification of prisoners who need close supervision because of the likelihood that they may try to escape or because they are difficult to control.

minimum security (level I)	A classification of prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimum amount of security. They are normally relatively near parole.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason the agency was established.
MSP	Michigan Department of State Police.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter coming to the auditor's attention that, in his/her judgment, should be communicated because it represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
security threat group (STG) prisoner	A prisoner who is considered a threat to the safety and security of a facility because of gang-related activities or affiliations or violence toward staff or other prisoners. Prisoners can be designated as STG I or STG II.
SMSCF	Standish Maximum Security Correctional Facility.
STG II prisoner	A prisoner who is a known leader of a gang or a group known to pose a threat to staff or other prisoners. STG II prisoners must generally be housed in a maximum security (level V) facility.