



# MICHIGAN

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

## AUDIT REPORT



THOMAS H. McTAVISH, C.P.A.  
AUDITOR GENERAL

“...The auditor general shall conduct post audits of financial transactions and accounts of the state and of all branches, departments, offices, boards, commissions, agencies, authorities and institutions of the state established by this constitution or by law, and performance post audits thereof.”

– Article IV, Section 53 of the Michigan Constitution

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Michigan  
*Office of the Auditor General*  
**REPORT SUMMARY**

*Performance Audit*

*Carson City Correctional Facility and  
 Boyer Road Correctional Facility  
 Department of Corrections*

Report Number:  
 47-219-05

Released:  
 January 2006

*The mission of Carson City Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Boyer Road Correctional Facility (BRCF) is to protect public safety by carrying out the sentences given to convicted felons in a humane, orderly, and cost-efficient manner that is consistent with sound correctional principles. CCCF opened in 1989 and has a prisoner capacity of 1,224. CCCF houses level I, level II, and level IV male prisoners. BRCF opened in 1987, has a prisoner capacity of 960, and houses level I male prisoners.*

**Audit Objective:**

To assess CCCF's and BRCF's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.

**Audit Conclusion:**

We concluded that CCCF and BRCF were generally in compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security. However, we noted reportable conditions related to gate manifests, security monitoring exercises, security threat group prisoners, self-contained breathing apparatus squad, fire safety, and sanitation and hazardous area inspections (Findings 1 through 6).

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**Audit Objective:**

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations.

**Audit Conclusion:**

We concluded that CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations were generally effective and efficient. Our report does not include any reportable conditions related to this audit objective.

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**Agency Response:**

Our audit report includes 6 findings and 6 corresponding recommendations. CCCF's and BRCF's preliminary response indicates that they agree with the recommendations and have complied with them.

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January 10, 2006

Ms. Patricia L. Caruso, Director  
Department of Corrections  
Grandview Plaza Building  
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Ms. Caruso:

This is our report on the performance audit of Carson City Correctional Facility and Boyer Road Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our report summary; description of agencies; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses and prior audit follow-up; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agencies' responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agencies develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

AUDITOR GENERAL



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## Description of Agencies

The mission\* of Carson City Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Boyer Road Correctional Facility (BRCF) is to protect public safety by carrying out the sentences given to convicted felons in a humane, orderly, and cost-efficient manner that is consistent with sound correctional principles.

CCCF opened in 1989 and has a prisoner capacity of 1,224. CCCF houses security classification level I\*, level II\*, and level IV\* male prisoners. BRCF opened in 1987, has a prisoner capacity of 960, and houses level I male prisoners. The security perimeters of the facilities are protected by electronically monitored chain link fences and are patrolled by alert response vehicles. CCCF security is further enhanced by two gun towers.

CCCF and BRCF are located in Carson City, Michigan, and are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. One warden serves as the chief administrative officer for both facilities. Shared services include: business management, human resources, training, physical plant services, and warehouse services.

For fiscal year 2003-04, CCCF and BRCF operating expenditures were approximately \$41.5 million. As of May 15, 2005, CCCF and BRCF had 557 employees.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

## Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

### Audit Objectives

Our performance audit\* of Carson City Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Boyer Road Correctional Facility (BRCF), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess CCCF's and BRCF's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.
2. To assess the effectiveness\* and efficiency\* of CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations.

### Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of Carson City Correctional Facility and Boyer Road Correctional Facility. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

### Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures, performed from March through May 2005, included examination of program records and activities for the period October 1, 2003 through May 31, 2005.

To establish our audit objectives and to gain an understanding of CCCF and BRCF activities, we conducted a preliminary review of their operations. This included discussions with CCCF and BRCF staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and examination of program records, DOC policy directives and operating procedures, and CCCF's and BRCF's operating procedures. In addition, we reviewed self-audits\*, monthly reports to the warden, community liaison committee meeting minutes, and the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections evaluation reports.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

To assess CCCF's and BRCF's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security, we conducted tests of records related to firearm inventories; employee firearm qualifications; medication control; drug testing; prisoner, cell, and employee searches; and accounting for prisoners. On a test basis, we inventoried keys and tools available for use by prisoners. In addition, we reviewed security monitoring exercises and documentation of items taken into and out of the facilities. We also reviewed procedures and conducted tests of records related to fire safety activities, preventive maintenance programs, and housekeeping and sanitation inspections.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations, we tested food service records and procedures related to Statewide menus, production, and quality evaluations. In addition, we analyzed prisoner store financial information and reviewed controls for prisoner funds and prisoner store operations.

#### Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

Our audit report includes 6 findings and 6 corresponding recommendations. CCCF's and BRCF's preliminary response indicates that they agree with the recommendations and have complied with them.

The agency preliminary response that follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agencies' written comments and oral discussions subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We released our prior performance audit of the Carson City Correctional Institutions: Carson City Correctional Facility and Carson City Temporary Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections (#4721997), in January 1998. Within the scope of this audit, we followed up all 10 prior audit recommendations. CCCF and BRCF had complied with 7 and partially complied with 1 of the prior audit recommendations. We repeated 1 prior audit recommendation and rewrote 1 for inclusion in this report.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS,  
AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

## SAFETY AND SECURITY

### COMMENT

**Background:** Carson City Correctional Facility (CCCF) and Boyer Road Correctional Facility (BRCF) operate under policy directives and operating procedures established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as well as operating procedures that were developed by CCCF and BRCF. These policies and procedures are designed to have a positive impact on the safety and security of CCCF and BRCF as well as to help ensure that prisoners receive proper care and services. The procedures address many aspects of CCCF and BRCF operations, including key, tool, and firearm security; prisoner, visitor, employee, and housing unit searches; prisoner counts; fire safety, preventive maintenance, and disaster planning; and food, medical, and educational services. Although compliance with these procedures contributes to a safe and secure facility, the nature of the prison population and environment is unpredictable and inherently dangerous. Therefore, compliance with the procedures will not entirely eliminate the safety and security risks.

**Audit Objective:** To assess CCCF's and BRCF's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.

**Conclusion:** We concluded that CCCF and BRCF were generally in compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security. However, we noted reportable conditions\* related to gate manifests\*, security monitoring exercises, security threat group (STG) prisoners\*, self-contained breathing apparatus\* (SCBA) squad, fire safety, and sanitation and hazardous area inspections (Findings 1 through 6).

### FINDING

1. Gate Manifests

CCCF and BRCF did not properly complete gate manifests to help control the movement of items into and out of the facilities.

Gate manifests provide a record of items (tools, supplies, materials, etc.) entering and leaving the facilities and are used to control and prevent the introduction of contraband\* and the theft of State property. Failure to properly complete and

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

monitor gate manifests could result in dangerous items being left inside the facilities and endangering the safety of staff and prisoners.

CCCF and BRCF operating procedure 04.04.100L requires gate manifests to include an inspection and approval by a gate officer and a verification of items returned through the gates.

Our review of 57 gate manifests for CCCF and 42 gate manifests for BRCF that were completed in January 2005 disclosed that 42 (74%) manifests for CCCF and 42 (100%) for BRCF omitted important information, with several having multiple omissions. For example, we noted that 82 manifests did not document that all items were brought out of the facility, 15 manifests did not list the individual who carried the items back through the gate, and 7 manifests did not indicate the individual completing the manifest. In addition, 2 manifests omitted the name of the individual carrying items into the facility and 2 manifests did not have the gate officer's signature and time of inspection. These gate manifests with omitted information identified items such as screwdrivers, a punch tool, and pliers.

We noted similar circumstances in our prior audit. CCCF and BRCF responded that they had taken steps to comply by establishing a process to document that items to be returned through the gates were actually returned. CCCF and BRCF also responded that they had taken steps to ensure appropriate supervisory review of manifest forms to ensure that the forms are fully and accurately completed.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

WE AGAIN RECOMMEND THAT CCCF AND BRCF PROPERLY COMPLETE GATE MANIFESTS TO HELP CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF ITEMS INTO AND OUT OF THE FACILITIES.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

CCCF and BRCF agree and informed us that they have complied by implementing necessary changes in monitoring the proper completion of gate manifests. CCCF and BRCF informed us that the third shift captain is reviewing all gate manifests and any discrepancies are being reported to the assistant deputy warden/inspector's office.

## **FINDING**

### **2. Security Monitoring Exercises**

BRCF did not complete all security monitoring exercises at the frequency required within exercise descriptions.

Performing the required security monitoring exercises would provide shift command with additional opportunities to assess the alertness of corrections officers in identifying potential security breaches and their effectiveness in implementing institutional measures to report and pursue the breaches identified.

BRCF had 18 security monitoring exercises. Corrections officers were required to complete exercises on a weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, and quarterly basis. We reviewed BRCF's exercise records for the period October through December 2004. Our review disclosed that BRCF had not completed 80 (38%) of the required 210 exercises.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BRCF complete all security monitoring exercises at the frequency required within exercise descriptions.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

BRCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. BRCF informed us that the assistant deputy warden of operations will ensure that the required number of security monitoring exercises are conducted and documented.

## **FINDING**

### **3. Security Threat Group (STG) Prisoners**

CCCF did not enforce cell search requirements for prisoners identified as STG prisoners. Effective monitoring of STG prisoners assists in preventing violence and improves the overall safety and security of the correctional facility.

DOC and CCCF classify prisoners considered a threat to the safety and security of the correctional facility because of gang-related activities or affiliations as STG prisoners. Known leaders of gangs or groups are classified as STG II prisoners;

affiliates are classified as STG I prisoners. CCCF housed only STG I prisoners during our audit fieldwork. DOC policy directive 04.04.113 requires that STG I prisoners receive a weekly cell search.

During February through April 2005 (a 13-week period), CCCF had 12 prisoners classified as STG I prisoners for various lengths of time. From our review of logbooks for this three-month period, we noted that CCCF did not document that staff completed 26 (19%) of the required 134 weekly cell searches. On average, CCCF inspected STG prisoner cells 1.36 times per week; however, CCCF searched some STG prisoner cells several times per week, but it did not search other prisoner cells as required.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that CCCF enforce cell search requirements for prisoners identified as STG prisoners.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

CCCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. CCCF informed us that all STG cell searches are being recorded in the appropriate housing units and are being monitored for compliance on a monthly basis by the assistant deputy warden of housing.

### **FINDING**

#### **4. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Squad**

CCCF did not ensure that all corrections officers were properly qualified in the use of SCBA equipment prior to assigning them to a SCBA squad. As a result, CCCF did not have assurance that adequate safety precautions existed in the event of a prison disturbance or fire.

DOC policy directives and CCCF and BRCF operating procedures require that 5 SCBA-qualified staff be on duty and available for response on each shift and that corrections officers be requalified semi-annually in the use of the SCBA equipment. We reviewed SCBA qualification records and SCBA assignments for 28 days

between March 1, 2005 and April 14, 2005 for CCCF corrections officers on two shifts. Our review disclosed:

- a. Thirty-six (64%) of the 56 shifts did not have SCBA squads that consisted of 5 corrections officers who were SCBA qualified. SCBA squads contained an average of only 4 SCBA-qualified corrections officers instead of the required 5 officers.
- b. Twenty-one corrections officers were not qualified in the use of SCBA equipment at the time of the assignment to a SCBA squad. All 21 corrections officers had been previously SCBA-qualified, but their qualification had lapsed. Qualifications for 2 corrections officers had lapsed in 2001 and qualifications for 2 officers lapsed in 2002.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that CCCF ensure that all corrections officers are properly qualified in the use of SCBA equipment prior to assigning them to a SCBA squad.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

CCCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. CCCF informed us that the shift commanders have been instructed to ensure that five SCBA qualified staff are on each shift. CCCF also informed us that each shift also has a SCBA trainer who monitors that SCBA staff maintain their SCBA certification through semi-annual training prior to the January 1<sup>st</sup> and July 1<sup>st</sup> expiration dates. In addition, CCCF informed us that the assistant deputy warden of custody monitors compliance with the requirements for SCBA.

### **FINDING**

#### 5. Fire Safety

CCCF and BRCF did not complete and document required fire safety inspections and fire exit drills.

Frequent fire safety inspections and fire exit drills would assist CCCF and BRCF in identifying potential fire safety deficiencies, prepare staff and prisoners for emergencies, and reduce the potential for loss of life and property resulting from fires.

DOC policy directive 04.03.120 and CCCF and BRCF operating procedures require correctional facilities to perform fire safety inspections of all areas of the facility on a weekly basis and fire exit drills in all locations normally occupied by prisoners or staff on a quarterly basis.

Our review of CCCF and BRCF fire safety records disclosed:

- a. For the period January through March 2005, BRCF did not document that it performed 30 (15%) of the 204 required weekly fire safety inspections. BRCF had 17 locations that required weekly inspections.
- b. For calendar year 2004, CCCF and BRCF did not document that they performed the required quarterly fire exit drills for all applicable buildings. CCCF could not document that it performed 10 (9%) of the required 108 fire exit drills, and BRCF could not document that it performed 35 (27%) of the required 132 fire exit drills. CCCF had 7 buildings that required quarterly fire drills during all three shifts and 3 buildings that required those drills on two shifts. BRCF had 9 buildings that required quarterly fire drills during all three shifts and 3 buildings that required those drills on two shifts.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that CCCF and BRCF complete and document required fire safety inspections and fire exit drills.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

CCCF and BRCF agree and informed us that they have complied. CCCF and BRCF informed us that fire safety inspections and fire exit drills are now tracked using a spreadsheet that is reviewed by the deputy warden.

### **FINDING**

#### **6. Sanitation and Hazardous Area Inspections**

CCCF and BRCF did not ensure that all required sanitation inspections and hazardous area inspections were completed and properly documented.

Regular formalized inspections of facility buildings and grounds are essential to ensure good sanitation and housekeeping practices. Inspections of potentially

hazardous areas enhance the occupational safety of employees and prisoners who work in areas where tools, machinery, and other equipment are commonly used. CCCF and BRCF have identified such areas as food services, maintenance, and the garment factory as potentially hazardous areas where a risk of serious injury exists.

DOC policy directive 04.03.102 and CCCF and BRCF operating procedures require that weekly sanitation inspections be conducted in all institution areas by a qualified department staff member and each facility shall conduct a comprehensive and thorough monthly inspection of all institution areas and submit a report to the warden.

DOC policy directive 04.03.101 and CCCF and BRCF operating procedures require each supervisor of a potentially hazardous area to conduct weekly and monthly inspections of those areas.

We reviewed documentation of inspections for 5 buildings at CCCF and 4 buildings at BRCF for February and March 2005 to determine if required sanitation and hazardous area inspections were completed. Our review disclosed:

- a. BRCF did not document that it conducted 11 (34%) of the 32 required weekly sanitation inspections and 6 (75%) of 8 required monthly sanitation inspections.
- b. CCCF and BRCF did not document that they performed 9 (22%) of 41 and 8 (24%) of 33 required weekly hazardous area inspections, respectively. In addition, CCCF and BRCF could not document that they conducted 4 (40%) of 10 and 8 (100%) of 8 required monthly hazardous area inspections, respectively.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that CCCF and BRCF ensure that all required sanitation inspections and hazardous area inspections are completed and properly documented.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

CCCF and BRCF agree and informed us that they have complied. CCCF and BRCF informed us that the sanitation and hazardous area inspections are forwarded to the deputy warden's office weekly. CCCF and BRCF also informed us that all received reports are recorded and any missing reports are requested. In addition, CCCF and BRCF informed us that reported deficiencies are addressed on a weekly basis.

## **FOOD SERVICE OPERATIONS, PRISONER ACCOUNTS, AND PRISONER STORE OPERATIONS**

### **COMMENT**

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations.

**Conclusion:** **We concluded that CCCF's and BRCF's food service operations, prisoner accounts, and prisoner store operations were generally effective and efficient.** Our report does not include any reportable conditions related to this audit objective.

# GLOSSARY

## Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

BRCF	Boyer Road Correctional Facility.
CCCF	Carson City Correctional Facility.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical with the minimum amount of resources.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving the facility through the front gates and sallyport.
level I	The classification assigned to prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimal amount of security. These prisoners are normally relatively near parole, are not serving for a sexual offense, and have no history of certain kinds of arson behavior.
level II	The classification assigned to prisoners who generally have longer sentences than do level I prisoners, who need more supervision but who are not likely to escape, or who are not difficult to manage. This classification generally covers open barracks-style housing.

level IV	The classification assigned to prisoners who have a sentence of more than 60 months, who can generally be managed in the general population of prisons, and who have not shown a tendency to escape from close security.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason that the agency was established.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter that, in the auditor's judgment, represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)	An atmosphere-supplying respirator for which the breathing air source is designed to be carried by the user.
security threat group (STG) prisoner	A prisoner who is considered a threat to the safety and security of an institution because of gang-related activities or affiliations or violence toward staff or other prisoners. Prisoners can be designated as STG I (members of gangs or groups) or STG II (leaders of gangs or groups). Prisoners who are designed STG II must generally be housed in a security classification level V facility.
self-audits	Audits performed by facility staff that enable management and staff to ensure that all operational units comply with policy directives and take proactive steps to correct any noncompliance. Performing self-audits is intended to maximize safe and efficient operations by DOC.



