



MICHIGAN

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

AUDIT REPORT



THOMAS H. McTAVISH, C.P.A.
AUDITOR GENERAL

“...The auditor general shall conduct post audits of financial transactions and accounts of the state and of all branches, departments, offices, boards, commissions, agencies, authorities and institutions of the state established by this constitution or by law, and performance post audits thereof.”

– Article IV, Section 53 of the Michigan Constitution

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Michigan
Office of the Auditor General
REPORT SUMMARY

Performance Audit

Report Number:
47-209-05

Cooper Street Correctional Facility

Department of Corrections

Released:
May 2006

Cooper Street Correctional Facility is a secure level I prison for males with a prisoner capacity of 1,360. The Facility also serves as a centralized staging point for prisoners transferring to the Department of Corrections' Camp Program and as a release facility for prisoners who are about to be paroled, discharged, or transferred to community center placement. The Facility is located in Jackson County.

Audit Objective:

To assess the Facility's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.

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Audit Conclusion:

We concluded that the Facility was generally in compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security. However, we noted reportable conditions related to gate manifests, tool control, employee searches, prisoner shakedowns and cell searches, metal detector calibration, and security monitoring exercises and fire exit drills (Findings 1 through 6).

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Agency Response:

Our audit report contains 6 findings and 8 corresponding recommendations. The Facility's preliminary response indicates that it agrees with the recommendations and has complied or will comply with them.

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May 9, 2006

Ms. Patricia L. Caruso, Director
Department of Corrections
Grandview Plaza Building
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Ms. Caruso:

This is our report on the performance audit of Cooper Street Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our report summary; description of agency; audit objective, scope, and methodology and agency responses; comment, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

AUDITOR GENERAL

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Description of Agency

The mission* of Cooper Street Correctional Facility is to protect the people of the State of Michigan by keeping prisoners safely contained within the confines of the prison, while also providing appropriate security to ensure that none of them escape from the many public work crews deployed throughout Jackson County and the immediate area. A goal of the Facility is to return each prisoner to his respective community with the desire and ability to live a law-abiding, productive life. A structured lifestyle is provided that requires full days of work in jobs and programs that help each prisoner prepare himself for life after incarceration.

The Facility, located in Jackson County, is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (DOC). It was created from the former Michigan Parole Camp and, with expansion to 1,360 beds and upgrades in security, became a secure level I* prison in July 1997. The warden, who is appointed by the director of DOC, is the chief administrative officer. For security, the Facility has double fences, razor-ribbon wire, a perimeter detection system, and a grounds patrol vehicle outside the prison's secure perimeter.

In addition to the preparation of general population prisoners for parole through the Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative (MPRI), the Facility maintains DOC's only male Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) Program and DOC's only male Intensive Reentry Unit (IRU). The RSAT Program is specifically designed for prisoners identified with serious substance abuse problems and is designed to provide a continuum of substance abuse treatment upon return to the community. The Facility provides 152 beds to the RSAT Program.

IRU, which was initiated in March 2005, is designed to help those prisoners who, for various reasons, have failed to stay out of prison in the past and are again ready to return to the community. IRU accelerates all the elements of MPRI by requiring a Transition Accountability Plan II (TAP II). The TAP II is developed to help each prisoner prepare himself to be successful upon return to the community. Field parole agents work with institutional parole agents and housing unit managers to bring community transition teams into the Facility to help each prisoner prepare for job placement, to

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

provide access to community help agencies, and to ensure that he has positive family reunification. The Facility provides 480 beds to IRU.

The Facility also serves as a centralized staging point for prisoners transferring to DOC's Camp Program and as a release facility for prisoners who are about to be paroled, discharged, or transferred to community center placement. All of these functions result in considerable prisoner movement into and out of the prison. During fiscal year 2004-05, approximately 11,600 prisoners came in and out of the gates of the prison. The monthly averages were approximately 480 transfers in, 290 transfers out, 170 paroles, 20 discharges, and 10 community center placements, or a total of approximately 970 prisoners moved each month.

For fiscal year 2004-05, the Facility's operating expenditures were approximately \$21.7 million. As of September 30, 2005, the Facility had 273 employees.

Audit Objective, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses

Audit Objective

The objective for our performance audit* of Cooper Street Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections (DOC), was to assess the Facility's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.

Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of Cooper Street Correctional Facility. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures, conducted from August through October 2005, included examination of Facility records and activities primarily for the period October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2005.

To establish our audit objective and to gain an understanding of Facility activities, we conducted a preliminary review of Facility operations. This included discussions with various Facility staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and examination of program records, policy directives, and operating procedures. In addition, we reviewed self-audits*, monthly reports to the warden, and community liaison committee meeting minutes. We also reviewed the DOC internal audit reports for selected operations.

To assess the Facility's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security, we examined records related to firearm inventories; employee firearm qualifications; employee training; gate passes and public works; security threat group (STG) prisoners*; medication control; drug testing; prisoner, cell, and employee searches; and accounting for prisoners. We also examined records for fire safety, preventive maintenance, and disaster planning. We reviewed procedures and records for security monitoring exercises, self-audits, visitor safety, telephone monitoring

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

systems, and documentation of items taken into and out of the prison. On a test basis, we inventoried keys, critical tools*, dangerous tools*, and firearms.

Agency Responses

Our audit report contains 6 findings and 8 corresponding recommendations. The Facility's preliminary response indicates that it agrees with the recommendations and has complied or will comply with them.

The agency preliminary response that follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

COMMENT, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

SAFETY AND SECURITY

COMMENT

Background: Cooper Street Correctional Facility operates under policy directives and operating procedures established by the Department of Corrections (DOC), in addition to regional operating procedures and operating procedures developed internally. These policies and procedures are designed to have a positive impact on the safety and security of the Facility as well as to help ensure that prisoners receive proper care and services. The procedures address many aspects of the Facility's operations, including key, tool, and firearm security; prisoner, employee, visitor, and housing unit searches; prisoner counts; and fire safety, preventive maintenance, and disaster planning. Although compliance with these procedures should contribute to a safe and secure facility, the nature of the prison population and environment is unpredictable and inherently dangerous. Therefore, compliance with the procedures will not entirely eliminate the safety and security risks.

Audit Objective: To assess the Facility's compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security.

Conclusion: We concluded that the Facility was generally in compliance with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security. However, we noted reportable conditions* related to gate manifests*, tool control, employee searches, prisoner shakedowns* and cell searches*, metal detector calibration, and security monitoring exercises and fire exit drills (Findings 1 through 6).

FINDING

1. Gate Manifests

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not properly complete gate manifests to help control the movement of items into and out of the prison. Improperly completing gate manifests could result in critical and dangerous tools being left inside the prison, thereby endangering staff and prisoners.

Gate manifests provide a record of items (tools, supplies, medications, etc.) entering and leaving the prison and are used to control and prevent the introduction of contraband* and the theft of State property. DOC operating

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

procedure 04.04.100 requires that gate manifests be completed in their entirety. In addition, Facility operating procedure 04.04.100J requires gate manifests to include an authorized approval, an inspection by a gate officer, and a verification of items returned through the gates.

Our review of gate manifests completed in March 2005 disclosed that 14 (13%) of 109 manifests were not properly documented or had omissions of important information. Four manifests were missing and 4 manifests did not document that all items were brought out of the prison. In addition, 4 manifests omitted the name of the individual requesting the item(s), 1 manifest omitted the name of the individual carrying items into the prison, and 1 manifest omitted the name of the individual carrying items back through the gate. The 14 gate manifests contained various items, including tools and medications.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that Cooper Street Correctional Facility properly complete gate manifests to help control the movement of items into and out of the prison.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied by implementing DOC's new gate manifest operating procedure. The Facility informed us that it has also revised its operating procedure to reflect the necessary changes and that the arsenal sergeant will now review all gate manifests, correct any discrepancies, and forward his findings to the inspector.

FINDING

2. Tool Control

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not maintain proper inventory control over critical and dangerous tools.

Proper inventory control over the tools helps ensure that all critical and dangerous tools are accounted for and that any lost or misplaced tools are detected and recovered in a timely manner. This helps to ensure the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.120A requires that the tool control officer maintain a complete and up-to-date master tool inventory listing and that the master tool inventory listing for each tool storage area be maintained in that area. This operating procedure also requires that the tool control officer perform monthly tool inspections of each tool storage area.

The Facility has 26 tool storage areas that must be inspected monthly by the tool control officer. Our review of tool records and 6 of the 26 tool storage areas disclosed:

- a. The Facility did not complete all required monthly tool inspection reports. Of the 52 required monthly tool inspections, 47 (90%) were not conducted or documented during the months of December 2004 and April 2005.
- b. The Facility needs to update its master tool inventory listing. Tools in the maintenance shed did not agree with the master tool inventory listing. Twenty wrenches and masonry stones were listed on the master inventory for the maintenance shed, but they no longer existed. Fifteen chisel bits in the maintenance shed and 2 shovels in the food service area were not identified on the master inventory. Thirteen tools (channel locks, a dry wall saw, a wonder bar, putty knives, and bolt cutters) in the maintenance shed were not properly etched with the tool number noted on the master inventory. In addition, 4 tools (channel locks, vise grips, and a concrete trowel) were etched with the wrong tool number.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Cooper Street Correctional Facility maintain proper inventory control over critical and dangerous tools.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees and will comply. The Facility informed us that monthly tool inspection reports will be completed and maintained in accordance with the retention schedule. The inspector will ensure that all master tool inventories are updated.

FINDING

3. Employee Searches

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not ensure that employees who work the third shift and normally enter the security perimeter were periodically searched. Also, the Facility did not ensure that gate officers conducted the required number of daily clothed-body searches* of employees.

Random searches of employees who routinely work inside the security perimeter can be an effective deterrent to contraband entering the prison.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 requires correctional facilities to establish the frequency of random searches of employees entering the facilities.

Our review of records related to employee searches disclosed:

- a. Third shift officers were not searched on a regular basis by gate officers. Our review of the employee shakedown log for the first 14 days in February 2005 and the first 14 days in June 2005 disclosed that gate officers performed less than five pat-down searches* of third shift employees on 20 (71%) of the 28 days, with no searches conducted on 13 (46%) of the 28 days. Facility operating procedure 04.04.110A requires the gate officer to conduct a minimum of five random pat-down searches of employees who clear the metal detector.
- b. Gate officers were not conducting any clothed-body employee searches for any of the shifts. Facility operating procedure 04.04.110A requires clothed-body searches of a minimum of five staff members each shift.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that Cooper Street Correctional Facility ensure that employees who work the third shift and normally enter the security perimeter are periodically searched.

We also recommend that the Facility ensure that gate officers conduct the required number of daily clothed-body searches of employees.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees and will comply by ensuring that employees are searched in accordance with the facility operating procedure. The Facility informed us that it has modified the employee shakedown log to indicate the shift that the staff person who was searched worked and to indicate the type of search conducted. These changes will assist the assistant deputy warden of operations who will monitor compliance with the operating procedure.

FINDING

4. Prisoner Shakedowns and Cell Searches

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not ensure that all officers performed and documented the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches.

Conducting the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches improves the Facility's likelihood of detecting and confiscating contraband and improves the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.110A requires that all nonsupervisory housing unit and custody staff with direct prisoner contact perform five prisoner shakedowns per day. Also, housing unit staff, except the night shift, are required to perform a minimum of three cell searches per day. The procedure also requires that prisoner shakedowns and cell searches be documented in the appropriate logbook or report.

Our review of prisoner shakedown and cell search records for three housing unit staff and all custody staff for 14 days tested in November 2004 and 14 days tested in June 2005 disclosed:

- a. Nonsupervisory housing unit and custody staff did not document or retain documentation for 1,063 (27%) of the required 3,875 prisoner shakedowns.
- b. Housing unit staff did not document or retain documentation for 283 (37%) of the required 756 cell searches.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that Cooper Street Correctional Facility ensure that all officers perform and document the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility informed us that it will ensure that prisoner shakedown and cell search logs and slips are retained for 12 months, not 6 as previously required. In addition, the Facility informed us that supervisors are now required to check their areas to ensure that the proper number of shakedowns and searches are conducted and that corrective action will be taken when the proper number of shakedowns and searches are not performed.

FINDING

5. Metal Detector Calibration

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not document its periodic testing of the calibration of its metal detector.

Periodically testing and documenting the calibration of the metal detector would provide assurance to custody staff that the metal detector is properly identifying metal objects on individuals so that those objects can be prevented from entering the prison.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.110B requires the metal detector to be calibrated weekly and logged in the gate logbook noting the date and time of calibration.

During our audit period, the Facility had not documented in its logbook that it had tested the calibration of the walk-through metal detector. Therefore, we could not determine when the Facility had tested the calibration of the metal detector. Under observation of the gate and bubble* officers, we walked through the metal detector four times carrying the same keys in our hands. Only once did the metal detector's

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

sensor detect the keys. The Facility informed us that the metal detector sensitivity is affected by the movement of the metal doors into and out of the bubble.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that Cooper Street Correctional Facility document its periodic testing of the calibration of its metal detector.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility informed us that the arsenal sergeant now records the weekly calibration of the metal detector in the front gate logbook. The Facility also informed us that staff reported that calibrations were completed; however, the calibrations had not been logged in the front gate logbook as required.

FINDING

6. Security Monitoring Exercises and Fire Exit Drills

Cooper Street Correctional Facility did not document the completion of all security monitoring exercises. Also, the Facility did not ensure that all fire exit drills are conducted quarterly on each shift.

Performing the required security monitoring exercises helps to ensure that custody staff are adequately trained in critical security measures. The exercises were developed to test established procedures by simulating the condition, behavior, or emergency that the procedures were designed to prevent or control. Also, security monitoring exercises help ensure staff understanding and alertness in critical security measures.

Conducting all required fire exit drills increases the likelihood that evacuation procedures are fully understood by staff and prisoners to help ensure their safety during emergencies.

DOC policy directive 04.04.100 requires that security monitoring exercises be conducted at least quarterly. In addition, DOC policy directive 04.03.120 requires that fire exit drills be held quarterly for all shifts and in all locations that are normally occupied by staff or prisoners.

Our review of records for the period January through March 2005 disclosed that the Facility did not document the completion of 38 (27%) of the 140 required exercises. Our review of records for the period January 2004 through June 2005 disclosed that the Facility did not conduct 17 (10%) of the 168 required fire exit drills.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that Cooper Street Correctional Facility document the completion of all security monitoring exercises.

We also recommend that the Facility ensure that all fire exit drills are conducted quarterly on each shift.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

Cooper Street Correctional Facility agrees with the first recommendation and informed us that it has complied. The Facility informed us that the assistant deputy warden of operations will ensure that all security monitoring exercises are completed and that the quarterly regional exercises are done. The Facility also informed us that the assistant deputy warden of operations will also retain all security monitoring exercise documentation to ensure consistent retention.

The Facility also agrees with the second recommendation and informed us that it has complied regarding fire exit drills. The Facility informed us that a sergeant has been assigned the duties of logging the fire drills and that he will forward his report to the assistant deputy warden of operations for monitoring.

GLOSSARY

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

bubble	Central point of entry and exit from a facility.
cell search	The act of going through a prisoner's cell and belongings looking for contraband.
clothed-body search	A thorough manual and visual inspection of all body surfaces, hair, clothing, wigs, briefcases, prostheses, and similar items and visual inspection of the mouth, ears, and nasal cavity. The only clothing items that may be required to be removed are outerwear (e.g., coats, jackets, and hats), shoes, and socks; however, all items shall be removed from pockets.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
critical tools	Items designated specifically for use by employees only or for use or handling by prisoners while under direct employee supervision. Critical tools shall be stored only in a secure area and shall be accounted for at all times.
dangerous tools	Items that may be used or handled by prisoners while under indirect employee supervision. Dangerous tools shall be stored only in a secure area and shall be accounted for at all times.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving a facility through the front gates and sallyport.
IRU	Intensive Reentry Unit.

mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason that the agency was established.
MPRI	Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative.
pat-down search	A brief manual and visual inspection of body surfaces, clothing, briefcases, and similar items. The only clothing items that may be required to be removed are outerwear (e.g., coats, jackets, and hats) and shoes; however, all items shall be removed from pockets.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter that, in the auditor's judgment, represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
RSAT	Residential Substance Abuse Treatment.
secure level I	The classification assigned to prisons that have secure perimeters, including double fences, concertina wire, and a perimeter detection system. They also have an armed alert response vehicle patrolling the perimeter. These facilities house prisoners who can be serving time for sex offenses and offenses excluded from level I facilities but otherwise are usually prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimal amount of security.

security threat group (STG) prisoner	A prisoner who is considered a threat to the safety and security of a facility because of gang-related activities or affiliations with or violence toward staff or other prisoners. Prisoners can be designated as STG I (members of gangs or groups) or STG II (leaders of gangs or groups). Prisoners who are designed as STG II must generally be housed in a maximum security (level V) facility.
self-audits	Audits performed by facility staff that enable management and staff to ensure that all operational units comply with policy directives and take proactive steps to correct any noncompliance. Performing self-audits is intended to maximize safe and efficient operations by DOC.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner, an employee, or a visitor to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.
TAP II	Transition Accountability Plan II.

