

PERFORMANCE AUDIT
OF THE
MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON AND CAMP OTTAWA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

January 2001

EXECUTIVE DIGEST

MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON AND CAMP OTTAWA

INTRODUCTION

This report, issued in January 2001, contains the results of our performance audit* of the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) and Camp Ottawa (CO), Department of Corrections (DOC).

AUDIT PURPOSE

This performance audit was conducted as part of the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Auditor General. Performance audits are conducted on a priority basis related to the potential for improving effectiveness* and efficiency*.

BACKGROUND

MBP, located in Marquette County, and CO, located just north of Iron River in Iron County, are under the jurisdiction of DOC. One warden serves as the chief administrative officer for both facilities. Shared services include: business management, mailroom, personnel, training, physical plant, warehouse, and fire safety.

The mission* of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. MBP, authorized by the Legislature in 1885, opened in 1889 and has a capacity of 1,148 prisoners. MBP houses minimum security* (level I) and maximum security* (level V) male prisoners. CO, which was placed under the jurisdiction of MBP in August 1998,

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

has a capacity of 240 prisoners. CO houses minimum security (level I) male prisoners.

For fiscal year 1997-98, MBP and CO operating expenditures were approximately \$32.3 million and \$3.5 million, respectively. MBP and CO had 479 and 48 employees, respectively, on July 24, 1999.

AUDIT OBJECTIVES,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
NOTEWORTHY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that MBP's and CO's safety and security operations were generally effective and efficient in preventing escapes and protecting employees and prisoners from serious injury. However, we noted reportable conditions* related to gate manifests*, monitoring of tool storage areas, key identification and inventory documentation, prisoner shakedowns* and cell searches, rounds of housing units, and monitoring of security threat group members* (Findings 1 through 6).

Noteworthy Accomplishments: MBP received acknowledgment from local law enforcement and the community for the effectiveness of the newly implemented emergency response team*, and CO received recognition from the community and local government for its prisoner public works crews' efforts.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

Conclusion: We concluded that MBP's and CO's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to fire safety and emergency generator testing (Findings 7 and 8).

AUDIT SCOPE AND
METHODOLOGY

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Marquette Branch Prison and Camp Ottawa. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Our audit methodology included the testing of records for the period October 1996 through July 1999. We conducted a preliminary review of MBP's and CO's operations. This included discussions with various MBP and CO staff regarding their functions and responsibilities; tests of program records; and a review of DOC policy directives, DOC procedures, and MBP and CO operating procedures to gain an understanding of facility activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit.

We analyzed safety and security operations and procedures related to prisoner care and maintenance operations for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and overall program effectiveness. In addition, we conducted surveys (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

AGENCY RESPONSES
AND PRIOR AUDIT
FOLLOW-UP

Our audit report contains 8 findings and 9 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated

that MBP and CO have complied or will comply with the 9 recommendations.

MBP complied with 6 of 8 prior audit recommendations. Two others were rewritten and included in this report.

January 22, 2001

Mr. Bill Martin, Director
Department of Corrections
Grandview Plaza
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Marquette Branch Prison and Camp Ottawa, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our executive digest; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; a description of survey and summary of survey responses, presented as supplemental information; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

AUDITOR GENERAL

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Description of Agency

The Marquette Branch Prison (MBP), located in Marquette County, and Camp Ottawa (CO), located just north of Iron River in Iron County, are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. One warden serves as the chief administrative officer for both facilities. Shared services include: business management, mailroom, personnel, training, physical plant, warehouse, and fire safety.

The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees the business office, physical plant, fire safety, warehouse, and food service operations.

The mission of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. MBP, authorized by the Legislature in 1885, opened in 1889. The facility housed 1,119 minimum security (level I) and maximum security (level V) male prisoners on August 4, 1999 and has a capacity of 1,148 prisoners. Prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, electronically monitored, double-fenced perimeter that includes 8 staffed gun towers. CO, which was placed under the jurisdiction of MBP in August 1998, housed 234 minimum security (level I) male prisoners within a fenced perimeter on August 3, 1999. CO has a capacity of 240 prisoners.

The facilities provide programs to prisoners that include academic/vocational education, substance abuse programs, psychological counseling, hobby crafts, recreation, and special activities. Prisoners are given the opportunity to work at the facilities to earn money for personal needs and to develop good work habits.

For fiscal year 1997-1998, MBP and CO operating expenditures were approximately \$32.3 million and \$3.5 million, respectively. MBP and CO had 479 and 48 employees, respectively, on July 24, 1999.

Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses

Audit Objectives

Our performance audit of the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) and Camp Ottawa (CO), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's safety and security operations.
2. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Marquette Branch Prison and Camp Ottawa. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures were performed between May and September 1999 and included the testing of records for the period October 1996 through July 1999. We conducted a preliminary review of MBP's and CO's operations. This included discussions with various MBP and CO staff regarding their functions and responsibilities; tests of program records; and a review of DOC policy directives, DOC procedures, and MBP and CO operating procedures to gain an understanding of facility activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit. In addition, we reviewed self-audits performed by staff, monthly reports to the warden, monthly warden reports to the DOC director, community liaison committee meeting minutes, and evaluation reports of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections of the American Correctional Association.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's safety and security operations, we conducted tests of records related to firearms inventories and employee firearm qualifications at MBP. Also, we examined records related to prisoner, cell, and

employee searches. On a test basis, we inventoried keys and critical and dangerous tools. In addition, we reviewed visitor safety, telephone monitoring systems, and documentation of items taken into and out of the facilities.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP and CO prisoner care and maintenance operations, we conducted tests of records and reviewed food service operations, cash receipts, inventory controls, fire safety procedures, preventive maintenance, emergency backup tests, and disaster management. Also, we analyzed prisoner store financial information and inventory controls and reviewed controls over the prisoner funds accounting system.

In addition, we conducted surveys (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

Agency Responses

Our audit report contains 8 findings and 9 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated that MBP and CO have complied or will comply with the 9 recommendations.

The agency preliminary response which follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

MBP complied with 6 of 8 prior audit recommendations. Two others were rewritten and included in this report.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

SAFETY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: The Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) and Camp Ottawa (CO) operate under the policy directives established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as well as operating procedures that are developed at each facility. MBP and CO are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. MBP operates within a secured, electronically monitored, double-fenced perimeter that includes 9 gun towers, 7 of which are staffed 24 hours a day, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols the facility perimeter. CO is a minimum security prison camp surrounded by a fence. DOC policies and local operating procedures have been implemented to help ensure the security of keys, tools, and firearms. MBP and CO staff conduct periodic searches of prisoners, housing units, and prisoner belongings to detect contraband*. All visitors must register when entering the facilities and are subject to search. DOC policy provides for periodic random searches of employees entering and exiting the facilities.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that MBP's and CO's safety and security operations were generally effective and efficient in preventing escapes and protecting employees and prisoners from serious injury. However, we noted reportable conditions related to gate manifests, monitoring of tool storage areas, key identification and inventory documentation, prisoner shakedowns and cell searches, rounds of housing units, and monitoring of security threat group (STG) members.

Noteworthy Accomplishments: MBP received acknowledgment from local law enforcement and the community for the effectiveness of the newly implemented

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

emergency response team, and CO received recognition from the community and local government for its prisoner public works crews' efforts.

FINDING

1. Gate Manifests

MBP and CO did not effectively monitor gate manifests to ensure that the movement of critical and dangerous items into and out of the secured areas was properly controlled.

MBP operating procedure 04.04.100h requires the preparation of gate manifests. The gate manifests provide for extensive documentation of the movement of items into and out of MBP and CO. Also, this MBP procedure requires that completed gate manifests be reviewed and maintained by the inspector's office at the end of each shift.

Our review of gate manifests for June 1999 disclosed:

- a. Eleven (28%) of 40 MBP gate manifests reviewed did not contain the signature of the individual carrying the item out of the facility when the manifest indicated that the item should be returned. Also, 7 (18%) manifests did not include the signature of staff carrying the item.
- b. Four (40%) of 10 CO gate manifests reviewed did not have the sender's signatures, 2 (20%) did not have authorizing signatures, and 1 (10%) did not have a receiver's signature.

Sufficiently documenting and monitoring gate manifests improve accountability and could result in detecting critical and dangerous items being left inside the facilities. Without proper authorization and reconciliation of gate manifests, the facilities cannot appropriately account for all items entering the facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP and CO effectively monitor gate manifests to ensure that the movement of critical and dangerous items into and out of the secured areas is properly controlled.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP and CO agree and informed us that they have taken steps to ensure that proper documentation and signatures are obtained on gate manifests going into and out of the secure perimeter.

FINDING

2. Monitoring of Tool Storage Areas

MBP and CO did not ensure that staff complied with procedures related to critical and dangerous tools.

DOC policy directive 04.04.120 contains requirements for tool control related to inventory lists, tool identification, tool inspections, and tool audits. MBP and CO procedures contain specific requirements for each facility to follow in maintaining appropriate tool control. Our review disclosed the following tool control deficiencies at MBP and CO:

- a. Two of the 3 maximum security (level V) tool storage areas reviewed at MBP had an inventory list that did not agree with the master inventory list, 2 areas had a tool that was not accounted for on the area's inventory list, and 1 area had 4 tools that were not properly identified and 1 item that was not accounted for on either the area's inventory list or the master inventory list.

One of the 4 minimum security (level I) tool storage areas reviewed had 6 tools issued without chits* to replace them and another area had 25 tools not properly identified.

MBP has a total of 31 tool control areas, which include the tool storage areas.

MBP operating procedures 04.04.120A and 04.04.120 require that a master inventory list be maintained for each tool storage area, that a chit and/or log system be maintained for issuing tools, that a daily tool check be made and reported on a weekly tool report, and that all tools be etched and color coded.

- b. CO did not submit 22 (11%) of the total 204 weekly tool inventories for March, June, and November 1998 and March and July 1999 for 10 of the 11 tool

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

storage areas reviewed. Also, CO did not conduct the required monthly tool audits for the four-month period ended July 31, 1999, and no annual audits were done since MBP took control of CO operations in November 1997.

CO operating procedure 04.04.120 requires that each tool storage area supervisor submit a weekly tool report to the tool control officer. In addition, the procedure requires a monthly audit of all tools and a quarterly audit of tools by the inspector in charge of tool control.

Tools are significant because they may be used as instruments of escape or as weapons. Maintaining accurate inventory records, properly marking tools for identification purposes, and submitting required reports could improve the detection of tool losses. Such losses could jeopardize the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP and CO ensure that staff comply with procedures related to critical and dangerous tools.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP and CO agree. Staff have been informed to use signatures/initials instead of lines or checkmarks when filling out forms and that daily and weekly report forms are not interchangeable. Updated tool inventory sheets will be provided to the tool control officer whenever there is a change. All tools have been properly identified. The extra tool has been removed. One employee was responsible for not chitting out tools. MBP informed us that corrective action was initiated, and a system by which all tools are properly chitted out has been put into place. CO's tool control procedure will be updated to reflect MBP as their supervising entity.

FINDING

3. Key Identification and Inventory Documentation

MBP did not properly identify its security keys and high security keys. Also, MBP did not complete and maintain documentation of the inventory procedures performed to ensure control over the keys.

DOC policy directive 04.04.100 and MBP operating procedure 04.04.100 require that all facility keys be considered security keys. Each security key shall be inscribed with a mark that clearly identifies it as a security key and shall be secured on a soldered key ring. MBP operating procedure 04.04.100 identifies "high security" areas designated by the warden and requires documentation of a daily inventory on all shifts by staff assigned to areas with key boxes.

Our physical inventory on August 23, 1999 of 178 keys located throughout the facility disclosed that 71 (40%) keys and 13 (7%) keys, respectively, were not marked to identify them as security keys and were not inscribed high security keys.

Also, 2 key rings were not soldered, and 1 key was misplaced and could not be located at the time of the inventory.

Our physical inventory on August 23, 1999 of 15 key box areas disclosed that staff did not document the daily inventory of keys in 5 (33%) areas as required by MBP operating procedure 04.04.100.

Proper identification of all security keys and high security keys helps to ensure that only authorized employees have access to secured areas. In addition, accountability for all keys is essential to help ensure the safety of staff and to reduce the possibility of prisoner escapes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that MBP properly identify its security keys and high security keys.

We also recommend that MBP complete and maintain documentation of the inventory procedures performed to ensure control over the keys.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP agrees. MBP informed us that all security/high security keys have been identified and stamped. MBP operating procedure 04.04.100 will be updated to reflect the documentation process for key checks and key inventories.

FINDING

4. Prisoner Shakedowns and Cell Searches

MBP and CO did not ensure that housing unit staff and custody staff* performed and documented the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches.

MBP operating procedure 04.04.110 and CO operating procedure 04.04.110 require that each custody staff with direct prisoner contact perform five prisoner shakedowns per day. Also, all housing unit staff, except the night shift, are required to perform a minimum of three cell searches per day. The procedures also require that facilities record prisoner shakedowns and cell searches.

Our review of cell search records disclosed:

- a. MBP housing unit staff for one housing unit performed and documented that only 348 (50%) of the required total 696 cell searches were performed in February and June 1999.
- b. MBP custody staff performed and documented that only 475 (79%) of the required total 600 prisoner shakedowns were performed on selected days in October 1998 and February and June 1999.
- c. CO housing unit staff performed and documented that only 656 (90%) of the required total 732 cell searches were performed in May and June 1999.
- d. CO custody staff performed and documented that only 130 (53%) of the required 245 prisoner shakedowns were performed for selected days in August and December 1998 and May 1999.

Conducting the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches improves MBP's and CO's likelihood of detecting and confiscating contraband and improves the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP and CO ensure that housing unit staff and custody staff perform and document the required number of prisoner shakedowns and cell searches.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP and CO agree. MBP and CO informed us that the shift commanders have implemented corrective action plans to remedy this situation and ensure documentation is complete.

FINDING

5. Rounds of Housing Units

MBP did not ensure that maximum security (level V) general population housing unit officers performed and documented required rounds and informal counts.

MBP operating procedure 04.04.101 requires that general population staff make rounds and informal counts in housing units at least once every 60 minutes at irregular intervals other than at formal count times. Documentation of the rounds will be logged in the housing unit logbook.

Our review of housing unit logbooks for a one-week period disclosed 24 (6%) of 378 instances in which staff did not document that a round or informal count was conducted at least once every 60 minutes.

Conducting rounds and informal counts in a timely manner and on an irregular basis helps to ensure the security of the facility and the well-being of prisoners. Without such procedures, the safety and security of staff and prisoners may be jeopardized.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP ensure that maximum security (level V) general population housing unit officers perform and document required rounds and informal counts.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP agrees. Informal counts and rounds were not always being documented in the housing unit logbook. Supervisors will ensure that officers perform and document the required rounds and counts.

FINDING

6. Monitoring of Security Threat Group (STG) Members

MBP did not ensure that custody staff complied with DOC policy directives and MBP operating procedures regarding the monitoring of STG members.

DOC classifies as STG members certain prisoners who are considered a threat to the safety and security of the facility because of gang-related activities or affiliations. Isolation of these prisoners is necessary to help monitor gang-related activities; to help prevent violence; to help ensure the overall security of the facility; and to help prevent the introduction of contraband, escape plots, and violence related to "turf disputes," debt collection, and other STG-influenced activities.

STG members possess characteristics that pose a threat to staff and other prisoners or to the custody and security of the facility. Known leaders of gangs or groups are classified as STG II prisoners.

DOC policy directive 04.04.113 and MBP operating procedure 04.04.113 require that STG II members receive a cell search not less than every three days and that STG I members receive a cell search not less than every five days. STG I and STG II members are required to be placed on an assignment only as approved by the DOC deputy director and be allowed a maximum of 60 minutes yard time.

Our review of housing unit records for 7 STG members disclosed:

- a. MBP did not always perform the required number of cell searches for 1 (14%) STG II member and 4 (57%) STG I members.
- b. MBP allowed 1 (14%) STG I member to work without the proper approval from the DOC deputy director and 1 (14%) STG II prisoner to have 90 minutes of yard time along with the general population.

Effective monitoring of STG members will assist in preventing violence and ensuring the overall security of the facility. Without effective monitoring, the safety and security of staff and prisoners may be jeopardized.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP ensure that custody staff comply with DOC policy directives and MBP operating procedures regarding monitoring of STG members.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP agrees. MBP informed us that a uniform system to track STG prisoner cell searches has been implemented in all of the housing units, the STG prisoner who was working has been taken off of his assignment, and yard time for STG prisoners has been changed to one hour.

PRISONER CARE AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: MBP and CO have developed procedures involving food service activities, prisoner accounting, prisoner store operations, fire safety, preventive maintenance, power plant operations, and disaster planning.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of MBP's and CO's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Conclusion: **We concluded that MBP's and CO's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient.** However, we noted reportable conditions related to fire safety and emergency generator testing.

FINDING

7. Fire Safety

MBP and CO should ensure that fire safety procedures are performed as required.

DOC policy directive and related facility procedures require annual flow tests of all fire hydrants located on facility grounds and quarterly fire drills on each shift. Procedures also require that an acceptable plan of correction be prepared,

including a date for correction, for all deficiencies cited as a result of monthly or annual fire safety inspections.

Our review of fire safety at MBP and CO disclosed:

- a. MBP did not always perform the required annual fire hydrant flow tests. A review of documentation for the annual flow test of 39 fire hydrants disclosed that 7 (15%) fire hydrants did not receive the required test.
- b. CO did not always perform the required quarterly fire drills. A review of fire drill reports for the 10 quarters ended June 30, 1999 disclosed that 9 (27%) of 33 required fire drills were not performed. Of the missing reports, 8 (89%) were from the third shift and 1 (11%) was from the second shift.
- c. MBP and CO did not correct deficiencies that were disclosed in monthly and annual fire safety inspection reports. At MBP, deficiencies that were reported in monthly reports dated October 1997 and February and August 1998 and annual reports dated 1997 and 1998 remained uncorrected as of July 1999. At CO, deficiencies that were listed in monthly reports dated April, June, October, and December 1998 remained uncorrected as of July 1999.

Compliance with fire safety requirements, including fire safety equipment testing, evacuation drills, and correction of all equipment and structural deficiencies noted during monthly and annual fire safety inspections, can improve staff's and prisoners' familiarity with evacuation procedures and help ensure that equipment is operating properly when an emergency arises.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP and CO ensure that fire safety procedures are performed as required.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP and CO agree. All fire safety inspections and equipment tests will be performed as required. The deficiencies that remain uncorrected are: the upgrades to the administration building, the old warden's residence, and the dairy barn. MBP informed us that appropriations to upgrade had been requested on an

annual basis and will continue to be requested, and when the appropriations are acquired, the deficiencies will be corrected.

FINDING

8. Emergency Generator Testing

MBP and CO did not perform weekly tests of their emergency generators as required by policy and procedures.

DOC policy directive 04.03.100 and MBP operating procedures require facilities to conduct weekly tests of emergency backup generators.

Our review of emergency backup generator log sheets disclosed:

- a. At MBP, 54 (40%) of 136 weekly emergency generator tests were not completed and 18 (13%) of 136 tests were between 1 and 4 days late.
- b. At CO, 33 (36%) of 91 weekly emergency generator tests were not completed and 10 (11%) of 91 tests were between 1 and 5 days late.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MBP and CO perform weekly tests of their emergency generators as required by policy and procedures.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MBP and CO agree. Appropriate generator tests will be performed and documented.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Description of Survey

We conducted surveys requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) and Camp Ottawa (CO).

We mailed surveys to 88 individuals and businesses located in the vicinity of MBP and received 27 (31%) responses. A review of these responses indicated that most respondents were satisfied with the MBP administration. Two respondents indicated concern about coming in contact with prisoners being transported to and from Mangum farm, a nearby farm owned by the State where some prisoners work for pay. Several respondents indicated concern over the lack of a plan of warning should there be a prison escape. We provided a summary of this survey information to the warden.

We also mailed surveys to 50 individuals located in the vicinity of CO and received 24 (48%) responses. A review of the responses indicated that most respondents were satisfied with CO and were not concerned about safety. CO had an active community liaison committee at the time of the survey and field visit. Three respondents made comments indicating their appreciation for the prisoner work crews, and two respondents felt that increased availability of the work crews was necessary. We provided a summary of this survey information to the warden.

MARQUETTE BRANCH PRISON (MBP) AND CAMP OTTAWA (CO)

Department of Corrections
Summary of Survey Responses

MBP: Copies of Survey Distributed - 88 Number of Responses - 27 Response Rate - 31%
CO: Copies of Survey Distributed - 50 Number of Responses - 24 Response Rate - 48%

1. How would you rate your satisfaction with the frequency of contacts between you or your organization and the Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	6	5	2	2	10	2
CO	11	5	1	0	6	1

2. How satisfied are you with how management of the Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa has addressed your individual concerns?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	4	6	4	0	11	2
CO	11	5	0	1	6	1

3. How satisfied are you with the timeliness in which your individual concerns are addressed by the Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	6	2	2	0	15	2
CO	10	3	2	0	8	1

4. How satisfied are you with the Marquette Branch Prison's or Camp Ottawa's process to notify the community of any problems or emergency situations related to the facilities?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	12	5	3	3	2	2
CO	11	6	2	0	4	1

5. Do you have any specific safety or security concerns that have not been addressed by Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa personnel?

MBP	Yes: 6	No: 20	No	Answer:
			1	
CO	Yes: 0	No: 23	No	Answer:
			1	

6. If you visited the Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa, were you satisfied with the security provided to you while at the facility?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	7	0	1	0	17	2
CO	11	2	0	0	7	4

7. Overall, how satisfied are you with the extent of communication between the Marquette Branch Prison or Camp Ottawa and the community?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
MBP	7	8	5	3	1	3
CO	11	6	1	1	4	1

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

chit	A metal tag issued to corrections staff member with his or her employee number inscribed on it. Corrections staff exchange the chit for temporary use of a key or tool in a correctional facility.
CO	Camp Ottawa.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
custody staff	Corrections officers and resident unit officers.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical for the amount of resources applied or minimizing the amount of resources required to attain a certain level of outputs or outcomes.
emergency response team	A specially trained team at each prison that responds to security needs or emergencies that may arise during the day-to-day operation of the facility. These teams respond to situations that may threaten the safety of the facility or pose a threat to the community.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving the facility through the front gates and sallyport.

maximum security (level V)	A classification of prisoners who need close supervision because of the likelihood they may try to escape or because they are difficult to control.
MBP	Marquette Branch Prison.
minimum security (level I)	A classification of prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimum amount of security. They are normally relatively near parole.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason the agency was established.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter coming to the auditor's attention that, in the auditor's judgment, should be communicated because it represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
security threat group (STG) member	A prisoner who is considered a threat to the safety and security of an institution because of gang-related activities or affiliations with or violence toward staff or other prisoners. Prisoners can be designated as STG I (members of gangs or groups) or STG II (leaders or gangs or groups). Prisoners who are designated as STG II must generally be housed in a maximum security (level V) facility.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.