

PERFORMANCE AUDIT
OF
BROOKS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
AND
MUSKEGON TEMPORARY FACILITY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

July 1999

EXECUTIVE DIGEST

BROOKS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND MUSKEGON TEMPORARY FACILITY

INTRODUCTION

This report, issued in July 1999, contains the results of our performance audit* of Brooks Correctional Facility (BCF) and Muskegon Temporary Facility (MTF), Department of Corrections (DOC).

AUDIT PURPOSE

This performance audit was conducted as part of the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Auditor General. Performance audits are conducted on a priority basis related to the potential for improving effectiveness* and efficiency*.

BACKGROUND

BCF and MTF are under the jurisdiction of DOC. One warden serves as the chief administrative officer for both facilities. Shared services include: business management, mailroom, personnel, training, physical plant services, warehouse services, and fire safety.

The mission* of the facilities is to protect society by providing secure settings for prisoners. BCF opened in 1989 and has a prisoner capacity of 1,230. BCF houses minimum security, medium security, and close security male prisoners. MTF opened in 1987 and has a prisoner capacity of 960. MTF houses minimum security male prisoners.

* See glossary on page 25 for definition.

For fiscal year 1997-98, the facilities' operating expenditures were approximately \$36.6 million. As of October 31, 1998, the facilities had 576 employees.

**AUDIT OBJECTIVES,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
NOTEWORTHY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness of BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations were generally effective. However, we noted reportable conditions* related to weapons qualifications; gate manifests*; tool control; keys, key blanks, and padlocks; and prisoner shakedowns*, cell searches* , and employee shakedowns (Findings 1 through 5).

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance.

Conclusion: We concluded that BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to backup generator tests, sanitation and physical plant inspections, cash and manual warrant controls, and operating costs (Findings 6 through 9).

Noteworthy Accomplishments: MTF has developed a sex offender treatment program that it believes is unique in the country. The primary goal of the program is to assess, treat, and reduce the sexually deviant behavior of sex offenders so that there are no more victims.

* See glossary on page 25 for definition.

BCF has developed an assault reduction program that is designed to increase prisoner problem solving abilities and reduce assaultive behavior.

**AUDIT SCOPE AND
METHODOLOGY**

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of Brooks Correctional Facility and Muskegon Temporary Facility. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Our methodology included the testing of records primarily covering the period October 1, 1995 through October 31, 1998. We conducted a preliminary review of BCF's and MTF's operations. This included discussions with facility staff regarding their functions and responsibilities; tests of program records; and a review of DOC policy directives, DOC procedures, and BCF and MTF operating procedures to gain an understanding of facility activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit.

We analyzed safety and security operations and practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and overall program effectiveness.

**AGENCY RESPONSES
AND PRIOR AUDIT
FOLLOW-UP**

Our report includes 9 findings and 9 recommendations. BCF's and MTF's preliminary responses indicated that they agreed and have complied with the recommendations.

DOC had complied with all 4 of the prior audit recommendations included within the scope of our current audit.

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Mr. Bill Martin, Director
Department of Corrections
Grandview Plaza
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is our report on the performance audit of Brooks Correctional Facility and Muskegon Temporary Facility, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our executive digest; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses and prior audit follow-up; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agencies' responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

AUDITOR GENERAL

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Description of Agency

Brooks Correctional Facility (BCF) and Muskegon Temporary Facility (MTF) are located in Muskegon and are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (DOC). One warden serves as the chief administrative officer for both facilities. Shared services include: business management, mailroom, personnel, training, physical plant services, warehouse services, and fire safety.

The mission of the facilities is to protect society by providing secure settings for prisoners. BCF opened in 1989 and has a prisoner capacity of 1,230. BCF houses minimum security, medium security, and close security male prisoners. Prisoners with different security levels are normally kept separate. They are allowed to be together only under limited, controlled situations. MTF opened in 1987 and has a prisoner capacity of 960. MTF houses minimum security male prisoners. The security perimeters of the facilities are protected by electronically monitored chain link fences and are patrolled by alert response vehicles.

The facilities provide programs to prisoners that include academic/vocational education, counseling and substance abuse programs, psychological counseling, hobbycrafts, recreation, and special activities. Prisoners are given an opportunity to work at the facilities to earn money for personal needs and to develop good work habits. BCF houses two correctional industries factories that offer prisoner work experience.

For fiscal year 1997-98, the facilities' operating expenditures were approximately \$36.6 million. As of October 31, 1998, the facilities had 576 employees.

Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

Audit Objectives

Our performance audit of Brooks Correctional Facility (BCF) and Muskegon Temporary Facility (MTF), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness of BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations.
2. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance.

Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of Brooks Correctional Facility and Muskegon Temporary Facility. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures were performed between July and November 1998 and included the testing of records primarily covering the period October 1, 1995 through October 31, 1998. We conducted a preliminary review of BCF's and MTF's operations. This included discussions with facility staff regarding their functions and responsibilities; tests of program records; and a review of DOC policy directives, DOC procedures, and BCF and MTF operating procedures to gain an understanding of facility activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit. In addition, we reviewed self-audits performed by staff, monthly reports to the warden, monthly warden reports to the director, community liaison committee meeting minutes, and the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections evaluation reports.

To assess the effectiveness of BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations, we analyzed safety and security activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and overall program effectiveness. Also, we conducted tests of records related to firearm inventories, firearm qualifications, searches of employees, key and

padlock controls, gate manifests, and cell searches and prisoner shakedowns. On a test basis, we inventoried critical and dangerous tools.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance, we reviewed procedures and conducted tests of records related to fire safety activities, preventive maintenance programs, emergency electrical backup tests, and housekeeping and sanitation inspections. Also, we tested food service records and procedures related to Statewide menus, production, and quality evaluations. In addition, we analyzed prisoner store financial information, reviewed controls for prisoner funds and prisoner store operations, and assessed payroll and accounting practices.

Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

Our report includes 9 findings and 9 recommendations. BCF's and MTF's preliminary responses indicated that they agreed and have complied with the recommendations.

The agency preliminary response which follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

DOC had complied with all 4 of the prior audit recommendations included within the scope of our current audit.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

SAFETY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: Brooks Correctional Facility (BCF) and Muskegon Temporary Facility (MTF) operate under the policy directives established by the Department of Corrections (DOC), as well as BCF and MTF operating procedures, which are developed internally. The security perimeters of the facilities are protected by electronically monitored chain link fences and are patrolled by alert response vehicles. Procedures have been implemented to ensure the security of tools, keys, and firearms. BCF and MTF staff conduct periodic searches of prisoners, prison cells, and employees for contraband*.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness of BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BCF's and MTF's safety and security operations were generally effective. However, we noted reportable conditions related to weapons qualifications; gate manifests; tool control; keys, key blanks, and padlocks; and prisoner shakedowns, cell searches, and employee shakedowns.

FINDING

1. Weapons Qualifications

BCF and MTF did not ensure that custody officers* assigned to the perimeter security vehicles and the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) teams were recertified in the use of the assigned firearms and SCBA equipment.

* See glossary on page 25 for definition.

Our review of training records for custody officers disclosed:

- a. Of 22 MTF custody officers who were assigned to the perimeter security vehicles in August 1998, 7 (32%) officers were not recertified in the use of the assigned firearms. Their certifications had been expired for 10 days to 3 months. The 7 officers accounted for 31 (33%) of the 93 assignments during the month.

DOC policy directive 03.03.100 states that all employees assigned to a position which requires the use of a firearm are to be certified with the firearm.

- b. Of 45 shifts of BCF custody officers assigned to the SCBA teams during March 1, 1998 through March 15, 1998, 6 (13%) shifts did not have the required five certified officers. Only four of the five officers were currently certified in the use of SCBA on these shifts.

DOC policy directive 04.03.120 requires five SCBA certified staff on each shift.

Proper firearms certifications and the proper number of certified SCBA staff are essential to the safety and security of staff, prisoners, and the community.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF ensure that custody officers assigned to the perimeter security vehicles and the SCBA teams are recertified in the use of the assigned firearms and SCBA equipment.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied. MTF is now using updated firearms certification lists. BCF is monitoring staff assignments to ensure current SCBA certification.

FINDING

2. Gate Manifests

BCF and MTF did not effectively document the movement of critical and dangerous tools and medical supplies into and out of the facility on the gate manifests.

BCF and MTF operating procedure 04.04.110A requires gate manifests to include a complete description of items transported, an authorized approval, an inspection by a gate officer, and verification of items returned through the gate.

Our review of gate manifests for June 1998 disclosed:

- a. Of the 686 BCF gate manifests reviewed, 124 (18%) listed critical or dangerous tools. Of the 124, 37 (30%) manifests did not indicate that the dangerous or critical tools were removed from the facility.
- b. Of the 346 MTF gate manifests reviewed, 75 (22%) listed critical or dangerous tools. Of the 75, 64 (85%) manifests did not indicate that the critical or dangerous tools were removed from the facility.
- c. BCF health services did not use gate manifests for daily deliveries.

Failure to document the movement of critical and dangerous tools weakens security and could result in the tools being left unaccounted for inside the facility.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF effectively document the movement of critical and dangerous tools and medical supplies into and out of the facility on the gate manifests.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied. BCF and MTF informed us that the gate manifest forms have been simplified to allow for greater ease of use by staff as some staff had failed to check the "out" box and sign the line entitled "return through." In addition, supervisory staff are doing weekly monitoring inspections to ensure that all manifests are

properly completed. Also, BCF informed us that health care staff were using a permanent gate manifest to get deliveries into the facility and that this practice has stopped and the procedure has been updated to prevent the use of permanent manifests.

FINDING

3. Tool Control

MTF was not effective in ensuring that staff complied with procedures related to critical and dangerous tools.

DOC policy directive 04.04.120 requires that the tool control officer perform monthly tool inspections and an annual tool audit. The tool control audits are to include a review of tool inventories, markings, and storage security practices.

MTF did not maintain documentation of the monthly tool inspections. We were informed that the inspections were performed, but MTF did not maintain documentation. Also, MTF did not have documentation for annual tool audits for 1996 and 1998. MTF informed us that the annual tool audits had not been performed consistently.

Because MTF was not effective in ensuring that staff complied with procedures related to critical and dangerous tools, it did not have assurance that critical and dangerous tools were properly controlled. Without this assurance, the safety and security of staff and prisoners may be jeopardized.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that MTF ensure that staff comply with procedures related to critical and dangerous tools.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that it has complied. MTF informed us that it has developed a simplified form to document when monthly inspections are completed. The form is forwarded to facility management monthly for review. The new form also provides for a method to document annual

inspections. In addition, MTF will continue to ensure compliance with procedures that require staff to perform daily tool checks and submit weekly tool reports.

FINDING

4. Keys, Key Blanks, and Padlocks

BCF and MTF did not ensure complete accountability for security keys, key blanks, and padlocks.

DOC policy directive 04.04.100 requires that security keys be accounted for during each shift and that inventory records of keys, key blanks, and padlocks be maintained. The inventory shall identify each key, lock location, and key ring to which it is assigned.

Our review of keys, key blanks, and padlocks disclosed:

- a. MTF administrative and personnel keys were not accounted for on each shift. Only staff with administrative and personnel keys have access to the boxes where the administrative and personnel keys are stored. Because the staff with administrative and personnel keys do not work each shift, the keys cannot be accounted for on every shift.
- b. The BCF locksmith was responsible for the inventory and control of key blanks. For 3 of the 4 key numbers in our test, the inventory of key blanks, the records of the number used, and the quantity on hand did not reconcile. One of the 3 key blanks is used to create the master key for the facility. Having someone independent of the locksmith periodically inventory the key blanks would increase BCF's assurance that all key blanks are accounted for.
- c. Padlocks can be obtained and used at BCF and MTF without being assigned by the key control officer and being added to the padlock inventory. Our test inventory of padlocks at six locations disclosed two locations that had 14 padlocks that were not included on the padlock inventory. Having the key control officer also assign padlocks would facilitate accurate records of keys and lock locations and help ensure that staff are provided with the keys needed to perform their duties.

Proper key, key blank, and padlock controls increase accountability for facility keys and help ensure that only authorized employees have access to secured areas.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF ensure complete accountability for security keys, key blanks, and padlocks.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied.

MTF informed us that the recent installation of an electronic key exchange system at MTF will ensure continual accountability of MTF administrative office and personnel office keys.

BCF informed us that the inspector investigates all discrepancies between the inventory count and the inventory records. BCF will ensure that the resolution of all discrepancies is documented. BCF determined that the discrepancy described in item b. resulted from an inaccurately reported inventory count. Therefore, no key blanks were missing.

BCF and MTF informed us that staff have been instructed to notify the key control officer of the need for additional padlocks so that the padlocks are added to the inventory record. In addition, the key control officer will check padlocks on a monthly basis to make sure that they are properly registered.

FINDING

5. Prisoner Shakedowns, Cell Searches, and Employee Shakedowns

BCF and MTF did not ensure that the required prisoner shakedowns, cell searches, and employee shakedowns were performed and documented.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 requires that each custody officer with prisoner contact perform five prisoner shakedowns per day. Also, all housing unit officers*, except the night shift, are required to perform a minimum of three cell searches per day. The policy also requires periodic employee searches. BCF and MTF operating procedure 04.04.110 states that all employees are to be shaken down at least monthly. These shakedowns and searches are necessary to help ensure that prisoner contraband is detected and confiscated and to help prevent the introduction of contraband into the prison.

Our review of prisoner shakedown, cell search, and employee shakedown records disclosed:

- a. Of the 210 BCF custody officer assignments during August 1, 1998 through August 15, 1998 with prisoner contact for which five shakedowns were required, BCF did not document whether the required shakedowns were performed for 138 (66%) of the assignments.
- b. Of the 150 BCF housing officer assignments during May 1, 1998 through May 15, 1998 for which three cell searches were required, BCF did not document whether the required searches were performed on 82 (55%) of the assignments.
- c. Of the 362 BCF employees required to be shaken down in August 1998, 40 (11%) employees were not shaken down. Of the 40 employees, 3 employees were not on the list of employees to be shaken down.
- d. Of the 204 MTF employees required to be shaken down in August 1998, 12 (6%) employees were not shaken down. Of the 12 employees, 7 employees were not on the list of employees to be shaken down.

Conducting the required number of prisoner shakedowns, cell searches, and employee shakedowns improves BCF's and MTF's assurance regarding the detection and confiscation of all contraband and the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

* See glossary on page 25 for definition.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF ensure that the required prisoner shakedowns, cell searches, and employee shakedowns are performed and documented.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied. BCF and MTF informed us that they have established monitoring procedures to ensure that the required number of shakedowns and cell searches are performed and documented. BCF and MTF also informed us that they have rewritten their procedures to provide for random shakedowns of employees. The randomness of searches keeps staff aware that a search may occur at any time and reduces complacency after the "monthly" search has been completed.

PRISONER CARE AND FACILITY MAINTENANCE

COMMENT

Background: BCF and MTF have developed procedures for prisoner care and facility maintenance. These procedures address prisoner store and benefit fund operations, preventive maintenance activities, periodic housekeeping and sanitation inspections, warehouse operations, food service activities, prisoner accounting, routine fire safety, and community liaison committee activities.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance.

Conclusion: We concluded that BCF's and MTF's practices and procedures related to prisoner care and facility maintenance were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to backup generator tests, sanitation and physical plant inspections, cash and manual warrant controls, and operating costs.

Noteworthy Accomplishments: MTF has developed a sex offender treatment program that it believes is unique in the country. The primary goal of the program is to assess, treat, and reduce the sexually deviant behavior of sex offenders so that there are no more victims.

This is a comprehensive program that consists of special housing and aftercare units, special staff meetings, staff training and involvement, a therapy review board, self-help programs, prerelease case consultations, community support network seminars, and outcome data collection.

As of November 1998, only 4.4% of the prisoners who participated in the program since its inception (fall 1991) and were paroled were subsequently charged with a repeat offense. This compares to other treatment programs that estimate that treated sex offenders have a 15% chance of reoffending after being released.

BCF has developed an assault reduction program that is designed to increase prisoner problem solving abilities and reduce assaultive behavior.

Prisoners, serving as group leaders, assist the group members in the exploration of personal motivation, underlying value systems, and existing problem solving skills. The group leaders emphasize nonviolent means of problem resolution with the goal of reducing assaultive behavior.

BCF reported the following calendar year assault statistics:

<u>Assault Type</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>
Prisoner on prisoner	33	42	24
Prisoner on staff	26	13	13

The number of prisoner on prisoner assaults increased between 1995 and 1996; however, the number of assaults decreased 43% between 1996 (year of program inception) and 1997. The number of prisoner on staff assaults decreased 50% between 1995 and 1996 and were unchanged between 1996 and 1997.

BCF believes the assault reduction program is a large contributing factor to the reduction in the number of assaults and to a safer prison environment.

FINDING

6. Backup Generator Tests

BCF and MTF did not ensure that emergency backup generators were tested at full load on a monthly basis.

DOC policy directive 04.03.100 requires that facilities conduct monthly backup generator tests at full load.

Our review of generator testing records for the 31 months ended July 1998 disclosed:

- a. BCF did not perform monthly tests for 15 (48%) months. Of the seven months in 1998, BCF did not perform tests for 4 (57%) months.
- b. MTF did not perform monthly tests for 7 (23%) months. Of the seven months in 1998, MTF did not perform tests for 5 (71%) months.

Testing the emergency backup generators at full load provides assurance that the generators will supply the needed power during an emergency situation.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF ensure that emergency backup generators are tested at full load on a monthly basis.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied by developing an annual schedule for monthly full-load tests.

FINDING

7. Sanitation and Physical Plant Inspections

BCF and MTF did not ensure that required sanitation inspections and the annual physical plant inspection of all buildings were performed and documented.

DOC policy directive 04.03.102 requires that qualified staff perform comprehensive and thorough monthly sanitation and housekeeping inspections of all institutional areas and submit inspection reports to the warden. DOC policy directive 04.07.103 requires documented food service sanitation inspections by the food service supervisor on each shift, by the food service director weekly, by the physical plant supervisor weekly, and by a designated administrative staff member weekly. Also, DOC policy directive 04.03.100 requires that the physical plant supervisor perform an annual inspection of all buildings to determine needed repairs and submit a report to the warden. The policy provides that the areas to be inspected include concrete and cement work, brickwork and structural tile, wall and floor tile units, waterproofing, metal work, roofing, flooring, woodwork, painting, and fences.

We noted that none of the monthly sanitation and housekeeping inspections of all institutional areas were documented. We also noted that none of the food service sanitation inspections by the food service supervisors on each shift were documented; none of the weekly inspections by the physical plant supervisor were performed; and none of the weekly inspections by a designated administrative staff member were documented. In addition, none of the annual physical plant inspections were documented. The physical plant superintendent informed us that the annual inspection of all buildings was completed but that it was not documented.

Documentation of inspections and submission of reports to the warden help to substantiate that inspections were properly performed.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF ensure that required sanitation inspections and the annual physical plant inspection of all buildings are performed and documented.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied. BCF and MTF informed us that the inspections were performed; however, documentation methods were inconsistent. All housekeeping, sanitation,

and physical plant inspections are now documented and included in the monthly reports to the warden.

FINDING

8. Cash and Manual Warrant Controls

BCF and MTF did not have sufficient controls over cash items received and manual warrants issued. We noted the following deficiencies:

- a. The facilities did not immediately log all cash items (check, money order, or cash) received. Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1270.02 requires preparation of a cash receipts log.
- b. The facilities did not have someone independent of the cash handling process verify the disposition of all cash items. Cash items are either deposited or returned to the sender. Independent verification helps to ensure that all money received is deposited and that errors or irregularities are detected in a timely manner.
- c. The same person who prepared the manual warrants also signed the manual warrants. Having someone other than the preparer sign the manual warrants helps to ensure that only authorized manual warrants are issued.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF establish sufficient controls over cash items received and manual warrants issued.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation and informed us that they have complied. BCF and MTF informed us that the logging of all cash items is now required. In addition, separation of staff duties has been implemented to verify the disposition of all cash items. Separation of staff duties has also been implemented for the preparation and signing of manual warrants.

FINDING

9. Operating Costs

BCF and MTF included the costs of employees who did not work at BCF and MTF in their operating costs.

Two employees who worked in the regional office in Ionia were charged to BCF's and MTF's payroll.

To accurately account for all operating costs, only employees working at BCF and MTF should be included in BCF and MTF operating costs.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BCF and MTF not include the costs of employees who do not work at BCF and MTF in their operating costs.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BCF and MTF agreed with the recommendation. BCF and MTF informed us that DOC is in the process of reorganization. Once the makeup of the regional offices is approved, DOC will contact the Department of Management and Budget to make the necessary technical transfers of full-time equated positions and employees and dollars between appropriated lines where applicable and obtain additional full-time equated positions and dollars as necessary.

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

BCF	Brooks Correctional Facility.
cell search	The act of going through a prisoner's cell and belongings looking for contraband.
contraband	Property which is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property which they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property which has been altered without permission.
custody officer	Corrections officers who do not work in a housing unit. These officers are assigned to the prison yard, visiting room, bubble (central point of entry into and exit out of the facility), etc.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical for the amount of resources applied or minimizing the amount of resources required to attain a certain level of outputs or outcomes.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies transported in and out of the facility.
housing unit officers	Corrections officers who work in the housing units.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason the agency was established.

MTF	Muskegon Temporary Facility.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter coming to the auditor's attention that, in his/her judgment, should be communicated because it represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
SCBA	self-contained breathing apparatus.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner, an employee, or a visitor to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.