



# MICHIGAN

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

## AUDIT REPORT



THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A.  
AUDITOR GENERAL

The auditor general shall conduct post audits of financial transactions and accounts of the state and of all branches, departments, offices, boards, commissions, agencies, authorities and institutions of the state established by this constitution or by law, and performance post audits thereof.

– Article IV, Section 53 of the Michigan Constitution

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Michigan  
*Office of the Auditor General*  
**REPORT SUMMARY**

*Performance Audit*

*Pugsley Correctional Facility*

*Department of Corrections*

Report Number:  
471-0247-13

Released:  
December 2013

*The Pugsley Correctional Facility was formed when the former Camp Pugsley was converted to a secure level I facility in 2001. The Facility is located in Kingsley, Michigan, and has the capacity to house 1,342 male secure level I prisoners. The Facility has four housing units and separate buildings for healthcare/administration, food service, school/gymnasium, maintenance/warehouse, and human resources/training.*

***Audit Objective:***

To assess the effectiveness of the Department of Corrections' (DOC's) efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Pugsley Correctional Facility.

***Audit Conclusion:***

We concluded that DOC's efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Pugsley Correctional Facility were moderately effective. We noted five reportable conditions (Findings 1 through 5).

***Reportable Conditions:***

The gate officers did not ensure that all gate manifests were properly completed. Also, the gate officers did not properly maintain their copy of all gate manifests (Finding 1).

The bubble officers did not ensure that all employees were cleared to enter the secure perimeter. Also, front gate officers did not document that they completed all required employee shakedowns (Finding 2).

The supervising officers did not document that they conducted all of the required visual observations of prisoners on gate pass assignments (Finding 3).

The bubble officers and control center officers did not document all required radio checks (Finding 4).

The Facility staff did not document all required entries for gate pass assignments, radio checks, prisoner shakedowns, perimeter checks, metal detector calibrations, and informal counts in the appropriate logbooks (Finding 5).

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**Agency Response:**

Our audit report contains 5 findings and 7 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicates that the Facility agrees with all of the recommendations and has complied with them.

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A copy of the full report can be obtained by calling 517.334.8050 or by visiting our Web site at: <http://audgen.michigan.gov>



Michigan Office of the Auditor General  
201 N. Washington Square  
Lansing, Michigan 48913

**Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.**  
Auditor General

**Scott M. Strong, C.P.A., C.I.A.**  
Deputy Auditor General



STATE OF MICHIGAN  
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL  
201 N. WASHINGTON SQUARE  
LANSING, MICHIGAN 48913  
(517) 334-8050  
FAX (517) 334-8079

THOMAS H. MCTAVISH, C.P.A.  
AUDITOR GENERAL

December 20, 2013

Mr. Daniel H. Heyns, Director  
Department of Corrections  
Grandview Plaza Building  
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Heyns:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Pugsley Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our report summary; a description of agency; our audit objective, scope, and methodology and agency responses and prior audit follow-up; comment, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; and a glossary of abbreviations and terms.

The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's response at the end of our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a plan to comply with the audit recommendations and submit it within 60 days after release of the audit report to the Office of Internal Audit Services, State Budget Office. Within 30 days of receipt, the Office of Internal Audit Services is required to review the plan and either accept the plan as final or contact the agency to take additional steps to finalize the plan.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Thomas H. McTavish".

Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.  
Auditor General



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## Description of Agency

The Department of Corrections' (DOC's) mission\* is to create a safer Michigan through effective offender management and supervision in its facilities and Michigan's communities while holding offenders accountable and promoting their rehabilitation. DOC's Correctional Facilities Administration is responsible for the operation of all State correctional institutions.

The Pugsley Correctional Facility was formed when the former Camp Pugsley was converted to a secure level I\* facility in 2001. The Facility is located in Kingsley, Michigan, on 23 acres in Grand Traverse County and has the capacity to house 1,342 male prisoners in four housing units. The Facility also has buildings that house healthcare/administration, food service, school/gymnasium, maintenance/warehouse, and human resources/training.

The Facility offers academic classes in adult basic education and general education development and vocational programs in the areas of business educational technology and building trades. The Facility also offers evidence-based cognitive thinking courses, such as Cage Your Rage and Thinking for a Change, and other prevention programs addressing psychological, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues. In addition, the Facility offers on-site routine medical and dental care; other programs and services including indoor and outdoor intramural sports, religious services, and the Michigan State University Master Gardener program; and various clubs.

The Facility's perimeter is surrounded by two 15.5-foot chain-link fences with the exterior fence covered with rolls of razor wire and both fences topped with razor wire.

Also, the Facility monitors the perimeter using an electronic perimeter detection system, video surveillance of the perimeter, and an armed perimeter security vehicle that randomly patrols the perimeter.

For fiscal year 2012-13, the Facility's General Fund appropriation was \$22.1 million to support 211 full-time equated positions. As of August 31, 2013, the Facility housed 1,335 prisoners and had 211 employees supported by its appropriation and 52 employees supported by other DOC appropriations.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

## Audit Objective, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

### Audit Objective

The objective of our performance audit\* of the Pugsley Correctional Facility, Department of Corrections (DOC), was to assess the effectiveness\* of DOC's efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Pugsley Correctional Facility.

### Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Pugsley Correctional Facility. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusion based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusion based on our audit objective. Our audit procedures, which included a preliminary survey, audit fieldwork, report preparation, analysis of agency responses, and quality assurance, generally covered the period October 1, 2011 through August 31, 2013.

### Audit Methodology

To establish our audit objective and to gain an understanding of the Facility's activities, we conducted a preliminary review of the Facility's operations. This included discussions with various staff regarding their functions and responsibilities; observations; and an examination of program records, DOC policy directives, and DOC and Facility operating procedures. Also, we reviewed the warden's monthly reports to the DOC director and critical incident\* reports.

To assess the effectiveness of DOC's efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Facility, we reviewed procedures and examined records related to arsenal inventories and operations; gate manifests\*; medication controls; prisoner counts; gate pass assignments\*; radio checks; food service; housekeeping sanitation; prisoner, visitor, and employee shakedowns\*;

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

mailroom operations; drug testing of prisoners; perimeter security; cell searches\* and area searches\*; metal detector calibration; preventive maintenance; security monitoring exercises\*; prisoner security classifications\*; firearm certifications and weapon permits; fire safety; administrative rounds; telephone monitoring; disaster management; community liaison committee; and self-audits\*. In addition, we inventoried critical tools\*, dangerous tools\*, keys, and padlocks on a test basis.

When selecting activities or programs for audit, we use an approach based on assessment of risk and opportunity for improvement. Accordingly, we focus our audit efforts on activities or programs having the greatest probability for needing improvement as identified through a preliminary review. Our limited audit resources are used, by design, to identify where and how improvements can be made. Consequently, we prepare our performance audit reports on an exception basis.

#### Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

Our audit report contains 5 findings and 7 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicates that the Facility agrees with all of the recommendations and has complied with them.

The agency preliminary response that follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion at the end of our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and the State of Michigan Financial Management Guide (Part VII, Chapter 4, Section 100) require DOC to develop a plan to comply with the audit recommendations and submit it within 60 days after release of the audit report to the Office of Internal Audit Services, State Budget Office. Within 30 days of receipt, the Office of Internal Audit Services is required to review the plan and either accept the plan as final or contact the agency to take additional steps to finalize the plan.

We released our prior performance audit of the Oaks Correctional Facility, Camp Pugsley, and Camp Sauble, Department of Corrections (47-222-99), in May 2000. Within the scope of this audit, we followed up 4 of the 6 prior audit recommendations. The Pugsley Correctional Facility complied with all 4 prior audit recommendations.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

COMMENT, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS,  
AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

## SAFETY AND SECURITY

### **COMMENT**

**Background:** The Pugsley Correctional Facility operates under policy directives and operating procedures established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) in addition to operating procedures developed by the Facility. These policy directives and operating procedures were designed to have a positive impact on the safety and security of the Facility as well as to help ensure that prisoners receive proper care and services. The policies and procedures address many aspects of the Facility's operations, including key, tool, and firearm security; prisoner, employee, visitor, and housing unit searches; gate manifests; prisoner counts; radio checks; security monitoring exercises; metal detector calibration; electronic perimeter tests; sanitation and food service inspections; preventive maintenance; and fire safety. Although compliance with these policies and procedures contributes to a safe and secure facility, the nature of the prison population and environment is unpredictable and inherently dangerous. Therefore, compliance with the policies and procedures will not entirely eliminate the safety and security risks.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness of DOC's efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Pugsley Correctional Facility.

**Audit Conclusion:** We concluded that DOC's efforts to comply with selected policies and procedures related to safety and security at the Pugsley Correctional Facility were moderately effective.

Our audit conclusion was based on our audit efforts as described in the audit scope and audit methodology sections and the resulting reportable conditions\* noted in the comment, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses section.

We noted five reportable conditions in the 28 areas reviewed. In our professional judgment, these matters are less severe than a material condition but still represented deficiencies in internal control that are significant within the context of our audit objective. The five reportable conditions related to gate manifests, employee searches, gate pass assignments, radio checks, and logbook documentation (Findings 1 through 5).

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

We evaluated the quantitative and qualitative factors of the exceptions identified within each of the reportable conditions. Also, we evaluated other significant qualitative factors, such as the effect of DOC's policies and procedures and the Facility's procedures on the overall safety and security of the Facility, the public's perception of the Facility, and the severity of critical incidents at the Facility.

In reaching our conclusion, we considered the five reportable conditions that related to 8 of the 28 areas subject to audit and the other significant qualitative factors. We believe that the results of our audit efforts provide a reasonable basis for our audit conclusion for this audit objective.

## **FINDING**

### **1. Gate Manifests**

The gate officers did not ensure that all gate manifests were properly completed. Also, the gate officers did not properly maintain their copy of all gate manifests. As a result, there is an increased risk that critical and dangerous items could improperly be left inside the prison, thus endangering staff and prisoners.

Gate manifests serve as the Facility's tracking mechanism for items (tools, supplies, medications, etc.) entering and leaving the prison and are used to control and prevent the introduction of contraband\* and the theft of State property. Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires that Facility staff ensure the proper completion of the gate manifests, including the authorizing employee's signature, the carrier's\* signature, and the receiver's signature, if applicable. Also, the gate manifest form (CSJ-404) requires that the gate officers retain the gate officer copy when manifested items enter the prison and match the gate officer copy with the carrier copy when the carrier leaves the prison. The gate manifest form also requires that the carrier cross through any blank spaces to preclude the addition of unauthorized items.

Our review of 193 gate manifests prepared during the periods January 15, 2013 through January 24, 2013 and April 2, 2013 through April 11, 2013 disclosed:

- a. The gate officers did not properly maintain their copy of 23 (11.9%) gate manifests. Specifically, we noted 5 gate manifests with original and carbon

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

copies fully intact and 18 gate manifests that contained the receivers' signature on the gate officer's copy. Both of these situations indicate that the gate officer gave all of the gate manifest copies to the carrier, therefore losing the tracking mechanism.

- b. The gate officers did not ensure that 34 (17.6%) gate manifests were properly completed. Specifically, we noted that the carriers did not cross through the blank spaces in the items list on 29 gate manifests, allowing the potential for anyone with access to the form to add unauthorized items to the list; the gate officers did not properly complete the "Gate Officer's Report" section on 4 gate manifests to indicate the proper disposition of the manifested items; and the gate officers did not sign 1 gate manifest to indicate his inspection of the manifested items.

The Facility indicated that it had not properly followed procedures to complete and distribute all gate manifests. For part a., we noted that the gate officer's position is a rotatable position and, therefore, all gate officers may not have been aware of the proper procedure to handle gate manifest forms. For part b., we noted that there was a breakdown in the Facility's control structure to ensure that the gate manifest forms were properly completed.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that the gate officers properly complete all gate manifests.

We also recommend that the gate officers properly maintain their copy of all gate manifests.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility indicated that it has conveyed to staff the importance of properly completing and maintaining gate manifests and that Facility administrators and supervisors are monitoring this issue and will ensure that deficiencies are addressed with staff. The Facility also indicated that it will provide additional training, if necessary, to ensure continuous compliance with gate manifest requirements.

## **FINDING**

### **2. Employee Searches**

The bubble\* officers did not ensure that all employees were cleared to enter the secure perimeter. Also, front gate officers did not document that they completed all required employee shakedowns. As a result, the front gate officers and the bubble officers were less likely to detect and confiscate contraband, thus endangering staff and prisoners.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires the front gate officer position to be staffed between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and the bubble officer position to be staffed 24 hours a day. This procedure also indicates that the front gate officers and the bubble officers work together to control the traffic entering the secure perimeter at the front gate.

We reviewed employee shakedown records for the periods January 19, 2013 through January 23, 2013 and April 12, 2013 through April 16, 2013 and observed staff entering the Facility's secure perimeter on August 12, 2013, August 26, 2013, and August 28, 2013. We noted:

- a. The bubble officers, in the gate officer's absence, allowed 9 employees to pass through the front gate and into the Facility's secure perimeter without the employees or their personal items being searched, after the metal detector alarm was triggered.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.110 requires that all employees pass through and clear the walk-through metal detector or be subject to additional scrutiny using the hand-held metal detector and a pat-down search prior to entering the secure perimeter. This procedure also requires the gate officer to inspect all personal items passing through the gate.

- b. The bubble officers, in the gate officer's absence, did not prevent a mail room employee from entering the Facility's secure perimeter with a box containing prisoner mail without searching the box on two separate occasions.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires the gate officer to inspect all packages passing through the gate.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

- c. The front gate officers did not document 8 (6.7%) of 120 required random employee shakedowns.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.110 requires the Facility to conduct periodic pat-down searches\* or clothed-body searches\* of randomly selected employees upon entering the Facility.

The Facility indicated that staff had not properly followed procedure to conduct employee searches. We determined that there was a breakdown in the Facility's control structure when the front gate officers were not at their post.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that the bubble officers ensure that all employees are cleared to enter the secure perimeter.

We also recommend that the front gate officers document that they completed all required employee shakedowns.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility indicated that it has provided written directives to relevant staff and that Facility administrators and supervisors are monitoring this issue and will ensure that deficiencies are addressed with staff. The Facility also indicated that it will provide additional training, if necessary, to ensure compliance with policy requirements.

### **FINDING**

#### **3. Gate Pass Assignments**

The supervising officers did not document that they conducted all of the required visual observations of prisoners on gate pass assignments. As a result, the Facility could not ensure that it properly monitored prisoners on gate pass assignments.

Some prisoners are allowed to work on gate pass assignments outside of the secure perimeter on the Facility grounds while being supervised by Facility staff.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

Facility operating procedure 03.02.121 requires the supervising officer to visually observe prisoners working on gate pass assignments and document those observations in the appropriate logbook. However, the Facility indicated that it documents the visual observations on the gate pass detail sheet instead.

Our review of the Facility's gate pass assignment documentation for 26 prisoners on gate pass assignments for the period of April 28, 2013 through April 29, 2013 and May 21, 2013 and May 22, 2013 disclosed:

- a. The supervising officers did not document that they conducted any visual observations for any of the 26 prisoners in the appropriate logbooks.
- b. The supervising officers did not document that they conducted any visual observations for 16 (61.5%) of the 26 prisoners on the gate pass detail sheets.

The Facility stated that it did not follow its procedure to document gate pass assignment prisoner observations.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the supervising officers document that they conduct all of the required visual observations of prisoners on gate pass assignments.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility indicated that it has revised and updated its operating procedure to require documenting visual checks and prisoner counts on the Gatepass Detail - State Grounds form. The Facility also indicated that it has revised the Gatepass Detail - State Grounds form to allow staff to record the visual checks and prisoner counts. In addition, the Facility indicated that it is taking steps to ensure that this information has reached involved staff.

## **FINDING**

### **4. Radio Checks**

The bubble officers and control center\* officers did not document all required radio checks. Periodic contact with corrections officers ensures that radio equipment is in working order and helps to ensure the safety and security of the officers and prisoners.

Our review of the Facility's documentation for all radio checks required for the periods January 19, 2013 through January 23, 2013 and May 13, 2013 through May 17, 2013 disclosed:

- a. The bubble officers did not document on the radio check sheet that they conducted 984 (16.0%) of the 6,157 required individual radio checks.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires that the bubble officers conduct and log, on the radio check sheet, individual radio checks at the beginning, middle, and end of the first and second shift for all officers; on an hourly basis during daylight hours for all single staff assignments\*; and every 30 minutes during hours of darkness for single staff assignments and all third shift staff.

- b. The bubble officers did not document in the bubble logbook that they conducted 64 (19.7 %) of the 325 required radio checks.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires the bubble officer to make an entry in the bubble logbook once the radio check procedure is complete.

- c. The control center officers did not document in the control center logbook that they conducted 5 (16.7%) of the 30 required 800 MHz radio checks.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires the control center officers to test the 800 MHz base station radio by contacting the Oaks Correctional Facility at least once each shift and record the check in the control center logbook.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

The Facility indicated that staff did not follow staff post orders or Facility procedure to record radio checks.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the bubble officers and control center officers document all required radio checks.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility indicated that it has revised and updated its operating procedure regarding institutional radios and that Facility administrators and supervisors are monitoring this issue and will ensure continuous compliance. The Facility also indicated that it will provide additional training, if necessary, to ensure proper completion and documentation of radio checks.

### **FINDING**

#### 5. Logbook Documentation

The Facility staff did not document all required entries for gate pass assignments, radio checks, prisoner shakedowns, perimeter checks, metal detector calibrations, and informal counts\* in the appropriate logbooks. As a result, the Facility may have exposed DOC to increased legal liability.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 states that logbooks are legal documentation that the Facility may present in a court of law. Various Facility operating procedures require notations in the appropriate logbook during the shift to maintain a chronological record of routine, unusual, serious, or critical activities that occur during the shift. Also, Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires staff members to read the previous shift logbook entries noting any unusual activity concerning prisoners.

In addition to the logbook exceptions identified in Findings 3 and 4, the Facility staff did not record all required entries in the appropriate logbooks for prisoner

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

shakedowns, perimeter checks, metal detector calibrations, or informal counts as follows:

- a. The housing unit officers did not document 65 (5.9%) of 1,100 prisoner shakedowns in the appropriate housing unit logbook. We noted that the housing unit officers generally documented the prisoner shakedowns on the daily prisoner shakedown report. However, because prisoner shakedown reports can be manufactured or fabricated, they may not be persuasive legal documentation that could defend the Facility in a court of law.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.110 requires that all prisoner searches be recorded in the appropriate housing unit logbook.

- b. The alert response vehicle officer did not document 16 (13.3%) of the 120 required perimeter checks in the alert response vehicle logbook or elsewhere.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 states that random perimeter checks will be conducted at least every two hours and that entries be made in the alert response vehicle logbook.

- c. The Facility inspector did not document 8 (100%) of the 8 required metal detector calibrations in the front gate logbook. We noted that the Facility inspector documented all metal detector calibrations in his monthly reports to the deputy warden. However, because the monthly reports can be manufactured or fabricated, they may not be persuasive legal documentation that could defend the Facility in a court of law.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.100 requires that the calibration of the metal detector be documented in the gate logbook noting the date and time of the calibration.

- d. The control center staff did not document 7 (14.0%) of 50 informal counts in the control center logbook. We noted that the control center staff documented 6 of the 7 informal counts on the count sheets. However, because the count sheets can be manufactured or fabricated, they may not be persuasive legal documentation that could defend the Facility in a court of law.

Facility operating procedure 04.04.101 requires the informal counts to be documented in the control center logbook once the count has cleared.

The Facility indicated that staff did not follow proper procedures with regard to documenting items in the correct logbook.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Facility staff document all required entries for gate pass assignments, radio checks, prisoner shakedowns, perimeter checks, metal detector calibrations, and informal counts in the appropriate logbooks.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Facility agrees and informed us that it has complied. The Facility indicated that Facility administrators and supervisors are monitoring this issue and will ensure that deficiencies are addressed with staff. The Facility also indicated that it will provide additional training, if necessary, to ensure continuous compliance with logbook documentation requirements.

# GLOSSARY

## Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms

area search	The act of searching common areas of the prisoner for contraband.
bubble	Central point of entry into and exit from a facility.
carrier	A person carrying gate manifested items into the Facility's secure perimeter.
cell search	The act of going through a prisoner's cell and belongings looking for contraband.
clothed-body search	A thorough manual and visual inspection of all body surfaces, hair, clothing, wigs, briefcases, prostheses, and similar items and visual inspection of the mouth, ears, and nasal cavity. The only clothing items that may be required to be removed are outerwear (e.g., coats, jackets, and hats), shoes, and socks; however, all items shall be removed from pockets.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
control center	Central area of communication for a facility. The control center has contact with all officers by radio and loudspeaker.
critical incident	An unusual event, situation, or threat that is identified by the Department of Corrections that may affect the safety and/or security of staff, prisoners, visitors, and/or operations of a correctional facility; attract public or media attention; or expose the Department to potential liability.

critical tool	An item designated specifically for use by employees only or for use or handling by prisoners while under direct employee supervision. Critical tools are to be stored only in a secure area and accounted for at all times.
dangerous tool	An item that may be used or handled by prisoners while under indirect employee supervision. Dangerous tools are to be stored only in a secure area and accounted for at all times.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Success in achieving mission and goals.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving a facility through the front gates and sallyport.
gate pass assignment	Assignment of a supervised prisoner to a work duty on DOC grounds but outside the secure perimeter of the facility.
informal count	A count of the prisoner population in which staff in each area of the facility (including housing units, school areas, and work assignments) and supervisors of off-site details account for all prisoners for whom they are responsible.
mission	The main purpose of a program or an entity or the reason that the program or the entity was established.
pat-down search	A brief manual and visual inspection of body surfaces, clothing, briefcases, and similar items. The only clothing items that may be required to be removed are outerwear (e.g., coats, jackets, and hats) and shoes; however, all items shall be removed from pockets.

performance audit	An audit that provides findings or conclusions based on an evaluation of sufficient, appropriate evidence against criteria. Performance audits provide objective analysis to assist management and those charged with governance and oversight in using the information to improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action, and contribute to public accountability.
reportable condition	A matter that, in the auditor's judgment, is less severe than a material condition and falls within any of the following categories: an opportunity for improvement within the context of the audit objectives; a deficiency in internal control that is significant within the context of the audit objectives; all instances of fraud; illegal acts unless they are inconsequential within the context of the audit objectives; significant violations of provisions of contracts or grant agreements; and significant abuse that has occurred or is likely to have occurred.
secure level I	A security classification assigned to a facility or a prisoner. The facilities house prisoners who have shown good institutional adjustment and behavior. These facilities have electronic detection systems, double fences, concertina wire, and an armed perimeter security vehicle patrolling the perimeter of the institution.
security classification	The classification assigned to a prisoner that indicates the potential for the prisoner to attempt an escape or assault another person.
security monitoring exercises	A systematic method of safely and effectively testing and monitoring security standards of a facility to enable staff to have an opportunity to practice the standards under controlled conditions.

self-audit	An audit performed by facility staff that enables management and staff to ensure that an operational unit complies with policy directives and takes proactive steps to correct any noncompliance. Performing self-audits is intended to maximize safe and efficient operations by DOC.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner, an employee, or a visitor to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.
single staff assignment	An assignment that requires an officer to work a position by himself/herself.



