



# MICHIGAN

OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

## AUDIT REPORT



THOMAS H. McTAVISH, C.P.A.  
AUDITOR GENERAL

The auditor general shall conduct post audits of financial transactions and accounts of the state and of all branches, departments, offices, boards, commissions, agencies, authorities and institutions of the state established by this constitution or by law, and performance post audits thereof.

– Article IV, Section 53 of the Michigan Constitution

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Michigan  
*Office of the Auditor General*  
**REPORT SUMMARY**

*Performance Audit*  
*Bureau of Elections*  
*Department of State*

Report Number:  
231-0235-11

Released:  
May 2012

*The Bureau of Elections' (BOE's) mission is to maintain the best balance of cost and quality in carrying out the Secretary of State's role in administering the State's elections process. BOE carries out the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of State under the Michigan Election Law, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, the Lobby Act, provisions of the Casino Interest Registration Act, the National Voter Registration Act, and the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA).*

***Audit Objective:***

To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to provide reliable and secure registered voter information in the Qualified Voter File (QVF) in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA.

***Audit Conclusion:***

We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in providing reliable and secure registered voter information in the QVF. We noted three reportable conditions (Findings 1 through 3).

***Reportable Conditions:***

BOE, in conjunction with local clerks, should strengthen control procedures to prevent, detect, and correct instances in which ineligible voters are recorded in the QVF as having voted (Finding 1).

BOE should provide additional direction distinguishing local-level and State-level

responsibilities to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of records contained in the QVF (Finding 2).

BOE should provide additional guidance to local clerks to help strengthen QVF access controls to ensure the integrity and security of QVF records (Finding 3).

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***Audit Objective:***

To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to administer required training programs in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA.

***Audit Conclusion:***

We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in administering required training programs in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA. We noted two reportable conditions (Findings 4 and 5).

**Reportable Conditions:**

BOE should enhance controls to further promote compliance with the Michigan Election Law regarding training of election officials, training coordinators, and election precinct inspectors (Finding 4).

BOE needs to improve its efforts related to election official and election precinct inspector training coordinator accreditation programs (Finding 5).

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**Audit Objective:**

To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to comply with reporting and disclosure requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Lobby Act, and Casino Interest Registration Act.

**Audit Conclusion:**

We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in complying with reporting and disclosure requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Lobby Act, and Casino Interest Registration Act. We noted three reportable conditions (Findings 6 through 8).

**Reportable Conditions:**

BOE's efforts did not ensure compliance with the timeliness requirement established by Section 16 of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act (Section 169.216(6) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) in its review of campaign statements and reports (Finding 6).

BOE should revise its memorandum of understanding with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) to define each party's specific responsibilities to monitor for prohibited contributions by persons with casino interests (Finding 7).

BOE did not ensure that casino interest registration forms were complete. Also, BOE did not directly notify persons who failed to register as holding a casino interest (Finding 8).

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**Agency Response:**

Our audit report contains 8 findings and 9 corresponding recommendations. The Department's preliminary response indicates that it agrees with 7 recommendations and partially agrees with 2 recommendations.

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A copy of the full report can be obtained by calling 517.334.8050 or by visiting our Web site at: <http://audgen.michigan.gov>



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AUDITOR GENERAL

May 15, 2012

The Honorable Ruth Johnson  
Secretary of State  
Richard H. Austin Building  
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Secretary Johnson:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Bureau of Elections, Department of State.

This report contains our report summary; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses and prior audit follow-up; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; a survey summary, presented as supplemental information; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's response subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a plan to comply with the audit recommendations and submit it within 60 days after release of the audit report to the Office of Internal Audit Services, State Budget Office. Within 30 days of receipt, the Office of Internal Audit Services is required to review the plan and either accept the plan as final or contact the agency to take additional steps to finalize the plan.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

Sincerely,

  
Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.  
Auditor General



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## Description of Agency

The Secretary of State serves as the chief election officer of Michigan and has supervisory control over county and local election officials in the performance of their duties. The Department of State's responsibilities include administering and monitoring compliance with the Michigan Election Law, the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, the Lobby Act, and provisions of the Casino Interest Registration Act (Sections 168.1 - 168.992, Sections 169.201 - 169.282, Sections 4.411 - 4.431, and Sections 432.271 - 432.278 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*, respectively) and implementing the National Voter Registration Act and the federal Help America Vote Act. The Secretary of State has assigned these responsibilities to the Bureau of Elections (BOE).

BOE's mission\* is to maintain the best balance of cost and quality in carrying out the Secretary of State's role in administering the State's elections process. BOE attempts to fulfill its mission by applying state-of-the-art technology to all of its programs; streamlining voter registration and elections management systems; enhancing the disclosure of campaign finance, election, and lobbyist reporting information; supervising Michigan's election officials in a manner that improves the effectiveness\* and efficiency\* of services to voters; and regulating compliance by candidates, political action committees, political parties, and lobbyists toward improving the quality of disclosure available to the public.

BOE's responsibilities under the Michigan Election Law include monitoring all elections to ensure that proper procedures are followed by election officials; managing and maintaining the Qualified Voter File in cooperation with the State's county and local election officials; and conducting Statewide training programs on the administration of the election laws.

BOE manages and maintains the Michigan Electronic Reporting and Tracking System, a program that permits the electronic submission of campaign finance disclosure documents by various committees registered on the State level, and receives and reviews filings submitted under the Michigan Campaign Finance Act and the Lobby Act. In addition, BOE provides services to the Board of State Canvassers by processing and verifying voter signatures on candidate nominating petitions, State ballot proposals, and

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

political party petitions; compiling Statewide election results; and evaluating new voting equipment submitted by local government officials for approval.

BOE consists of the Disclosure Data Division, Elections Liaison Division, and Program Development Division. BOE had 36 employees as of May 2011 and was appropriated \$11.3 million for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2010.

## Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

### Audit Objectives

Our performance audit\* of the Bureau of Elections (BOE), Department of State, had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to provide reliable and secure registered voter information in the Qualified Voter File (QVF) in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
2. To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to administer required training programs in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA.
3. To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to comply with reporting and disclosure requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, Lobby Act, and Casino Interest Registration Act.

### Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Bureau of Elections. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Our audit procedures, conducted from May through September 2011, generally covered the period October 1, 2008 through June 9, 2011.

Supplemental information is presented in the survey summary. Our audit was not directed toward expressing a conclusion on this information and, accordingly, we express no conclusion on it.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

## Audit Methodology

Our methodology included performing a preliminary review of BOE's operations to gain an understanding of its operations and to plan our audit. This included interviewing BOE management personnel and reviewing applicable statutes, administrative rules, policies and procedures, and BOE activities and program records.

To accomplish our first objective, we documented and assessed the effectiveness of applicable internal control\* of the QVF. We surveyed users of the QVF to obtain their opinion of its usefulness and reliability. Also, we assessed the accuracy of selected voter records contained in the QVF by conducting data matches between the QVF and the Department of Corrections' Offender Management Network Information\* (OMNI) data and the Department of Community Health's death records.

To accomplish our second objective, we evaluated BOE's efforts to establish and implement election official and election precinct inspector training coordinator\* accreditation programs. We also evaluated BOE's efforts to identify and document all election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators that required training. We surveyed election officials to obtain their opinion of BOE training programs. We reviewed the accreditation status of all county clerks and 40 randomly selected city, township, and village clerks. Also, we assessed BOE's efforts to ensure that all election precinct inspectors\* received required training prior to serving on an election.

To accomplish our third objective, we reviewed applicable statutes, administrative rules, and policies and procedures. We randomly selected campaign finance contribution and expenditure reports to verify BOE's administration of and candidate committees' compliance with reporting and disclosure requirements in the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. We reviewed randomly selected lobbyist files to verify BOE's administration of and the lobbyists' compliance with the Lobby Act. We also verified that BOE reported the names of persons with casino interests and reviewed its procedures to identify persons with casino interests who may have made prohibited contributions.

When selecting activities or programs for audit, we use an approach based on assessment of risk and opportunity for improvement. Accordingly, we focus our audit efforts on activities or programs having the greatest probability for needing improvement as identified through a preliminary review. Our limited audit resources are used, by

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

design, to identify where and how improvements can be made. Consequently, we prepare our performance audit reports on an exception basis.

#### Agency Responses and Prior Audit Follow-Up

Our audit report contains 8 findings and 9 corresponding recommendations. The Department's preliminary response indicates that it agrees with 7 recommendations and partially agrees with 2 recommendations.

The agency preliminary response that follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and the State of Michigan Financial Management Guide (Part VII, Chapter 4, Section 100) require BOE to develop a plan to comply with the audit recommendations and submit it within 60 days after release of the audit report to the Office of Internal Audit Services, State Budget Office. Within 30 days of receipt, the Office of Internal Audit Services is required to review the plan and either accept the plan as final or contact the agency to take additional steps to finalize the plan.

We released our prior performance audit of the Bureau of Elections, Department of State (23-235-01), in February 2003. Within the scope of this audit, we followed up 4 of 5 prior audit recommendations. The Department of State complied with 1 of the 4 prior audit recommendations, and we rewrote the 3 other prior audit recommendations for inclusion in Findings 2, 4, 5, and 7 of this audit report.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS,  
AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

## RELIABLE AND SECURE REGISTERED VOTER INFORMATION IN THE QUALIFIED VOTER FILE

### COMMENT

**Background:** To meet the various needs of the voter registration program, the Legislature initiated legislation that required the Secretary of State to establish and maintain the Qualified Voter File (QVF). Placed into operation in 1998, the QVF is a database that ties Michigan's approximately 1,500 local jurisdictions (cities and townships) and 83 counties to a fully automated, interactive, Statewide voter registration file to achieve a wide variety of advantages, including eliminating duplicate voter registration records in the system, streamlining the State's voter registration cancellation process, eliminating registration forwarding errors, and eliminating duplicative voter registration processing tasks. The local jurisdictions are responsible for verifying the accuracy of the names and addresses of approximately 7.3 million registered voters in the QVF.

With the implementation of the QVF, each "motor/voter"\* registration transaction executed by a Secretary of State branch office or by mail is electronically forwarded to the appropriate election official; a paper copy of the transaction follows within days to confirm the electronic notification and to supply the election official with the voter's signature.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness of the Bureau of Elections' (BOE's) efforts to provide reliable and secure registered voter information in the QVF in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA).

**Audit Conclusion:** **We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in providing reliable and secure registered voter information in the QVF.** Our audit disclosed three reportable conditions\* related to the QVF voter history file, defining QVF responsibilities, and QVF access controls (Findings 1 through 3).

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

## **FINDING**

### 1. **QVF Voter History File**

BOE, in conjunction with local clerks, should strengthen control procedures to prevent, detect, and correct instances in which ineligible voters are recorded in the QVF as having voted. Although the electronic record indicates that these individuals voted, a clerical error could have occurred or another individual could have used the incarcerated or deceased voter's identity to cast a ballot. Either way, these types of discrepancies reflect poorly on the integrity of the database. Implementing control procedures to prevent, detect, and correct such instances would help to ensure the integrity of the database.

Section 509m of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.509m of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) established a Statewide qualified voter file to increase the efficiency and decrease the public cost of maintaining voter registration files and to apply technology and information gathered by principal executive departments; State agencies; and county, city, township, and village clerks in a manner that ensures that accurate and current records of qualified voters are maintained.

To be eligible to vote in the State of Michigan, Section 492 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.492 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires that a person be a citizen of the United States; not less than 18 years of age; a resident of the State for not less than 30 days; and a resident of the township, city, or village on or before the thirtieth day before the next regular or special election or primary election. Also, Section 758b of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.758b of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that a person who, in a court of this or another state or in a federal court, has been legally convicted and sentenced for a crime for which the penalty imposed is confinement in jail or prison shall not vote, offer to vote, attempt to vote, or be permitted to vote at an election while confined.

At the time of our review, there were 7.3 million registered voters that had a QVF voter status that would make it legally eligible for the individual to vote. We performed an electronic data match of the QVF voter history record to the Department of Corrections' (DOC's) Offender Management Network Information (OMNI) data and the Department of Community Health's death records. Our methodology reflected only the most conservative results based on matches of

data elements, such as name, date of birth, and/or social security number. Our review of the QVF voter history file disclosed:

- a. BOE, in conjunction with local clerks, should implement control procedures to identify registered voters that have been legally convicted and sentenced for a crime for which the penalty imposed is confinement in jail or prison. Without such control procedures, it is possible for absentee ballots to be submitted on the incarcerated person's behalf. Also, without such control procedures, incarcerated persons may be included on precinct voter rolls as eligible voters.

Our review disclosed:

- (1) Forty-eight unique individuals recorded in the QVF voter history file as having voted were also recorded as incarcerated in DOC's OMNI database during that same time frame. Our review was based on a match of first name, last name, date of birth, and social security numbers between the QVF voter history file and DOC's OMNI database. Although these 48 confirmed unique individuals were recorded as incarcerated, the QVF showed them as having voted 52 times during the audit period (October 1, 2008 through June 9, 2011), of which 8 (15%) were recorded as absentee ballots and 44 (85%) were in-person votes.
- (2) Sixty-five additional unique individuals recorded in the QVF voter history file as having voted were also recorded as incarcerated in DOC's OMNI database during that same time frame. Our review was based on a match of first name, last name, and date of birth between the QVF voter history file and DOC's OMNI database. Data was not available to confirm a social security match for these individuals. Although these 65 unique individuals were recorded as incarcerated, the QVF showed them as having voted 68 times during the audit period (October 1, 2008 through June 9, 2011), of which 10 (15%) were recorded as absentee ballots and 58 (85%) were recorded as in-person votes. Further review is needed to determine whether the matches actually correspond to incarcerated persons.

- b. BOE, in conjunction with local clerks, should strengthen control procedures to prevent the recording of deceased voters as having voted.

Our review disclosed that the QVF voter history file showed that 1,375 unique deceased individuals were recorded as having voted a total of 1,381 times during the audit period. Our match was based on first name, middle name/initial, last name, date of birth, and address matches between the QVF voter history file and the Department of Community Health's death records. Of the total 1,381 recorded votes, 1,236 (90%) were cast as absentee ballots and 145 (10%) were in-person votes. As of the date of our review, 105 (8%) of the 1,375 unique individuals identified as deceased still had a QVF status that would allow the individual to vote.

We also identified an additional 153 unique deceased individuals recorded as having voted using the same match criteria described in the preceding paragraph, except these 153 individuals' middle name/initial did not match between the QVF voter history file and the file of deceased persons. Further review is needed to determine whether the matches actually correspond to deceased persons.

BOE stated that a deceased person voting by absentee ballot is oftentimes a timing issue. For example, it is possible for an individual to submit an absentee ballot and pass away shortly thereafter. However, BOE and/or the clerk may not become aware of the individual's death until after the election date, therefore making it difficult for BOE and/or the clerk to know that the individual was deceased when counting the absentee ballot.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE, in conjunction with local clerks, strengthen control procedures to prevent, detect, and correct instances in which ineligible voters are recorded in the QVF as having voted.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees in part and will comply with the Auditor's recommendations that are within the Department's purview and capability. The Department agrees to work with local election officials to more strongly reinforce established procedures

to ensure, to the extent possible, that they do not make clerical errors while recording voter history. The Department informed us that the actual recording of voter history is legally a local, not State, responsibility. The Department also informed us that in every instance where it appears a deceased person or incarcerated person voted and local records were available, a clerical error was established as the reason for the situation. In addition, the Department informed us that in some cases, voters submitted absent voter ballots shortly before they died. The Department informed us that the examples provided did not result in a single verified case that an ineligible person voted. The Department indicated that it has already instituted substantial improvements and control procedures that ensure that these errors will not occur, to the best of its ability. The Department stated that these improvements and control procedures include instituting an electronic pollbook (EPB) program in use in the majority of precincts Statewide (approximately 80% by August 2012); redesign of paper QVF lists (used by non-EPB users to record voter history); weekly record checks against the Social Security Administration death record files, to ensure deceased individuals are removed from the file as expeditiously as possible; and seeking legislation to require local clerks to retain election documents for six years (instead of the current two years) to verify accuracy of voter history. With regard to ensuring that incarcerated individuals do not vote, the Department notes that DOC officials have indicated that procedures are in place to ensure incarcerated individuals do not receive absentee ballots. The Department agrees to work with DOC officials to communicate key election related deadlines and reminders to help ensure DOC procedures are followed.

## **FINDING**

### **2. Defining QVF Responsibilities**

BOE should provide additional direction distinguishing local-level and State-level responsibilities to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of records contained in the QVF. Defining these responsibilities would help to improve the integrity of the records contained in the QVF.

Section 21 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.21 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) provides that the Secretary of State shall be the chief election officer of the State and shall have supervisory control over the approximately 1,700 county and

local election officials in the performance of their duties under provisions of the statute.

Section 509m(1) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.509m(1) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that the purpose of the QVF is to enhance the uniformity of the administration of elections by maintaining a Statewide file of qualified voters, to increase the efficiency and decrease the public cost of maintaining voter registration files, and to increase the integrity of the voting process by creating a single QVF that will permit the name of each citizen to appear only once in the system. Section 509o of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.509o of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that the Secretary of State shall direct and supervise the establishment and maintenance of the Statewide QVF.

We sent electronic surveys to 1,509 county, city, and township clerks with a BOE-assigned QVF e-mail address (see survey summary, presented as supplemental information). BOE informed us that only 890 (59%) of the 1,509 clerks had QVF access. The survey results support the need for additional direction. For example, in our survey:

- a. We asked clerks to select a statement from a range of statements that best described each clerk's responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the jurisdiction's QVF data. Of the 414 responses, 181 (44%) clerks said they share that responsibility with BOE, 171 (41%) clerks said they are fully responsible for their jurisdiction's data, 22 (5%) clerks said they are not at all responsible for their jurisdiction's data, and 40 (10%) clerks said they did not know.

BOE stated that local jurisdictions hold all responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of QVF data. Our survey results show that 59% of clerks responding to this question did not share that same understanding.

- b. We asked clerks if they were aware of a recent instance in which the QVF data was inaccurate or incomplete. Of the total 424 clerk responses, 343 (81%) clerks responded that they were not aware of a recent instance in which QVF data was inaccurate and 81 (19%) clerks responded that they were

aware of a recent instance in which QVF data was inaccurate. Of the total 423 clerk responses, 379 (90%) responded that they were not aware of a recent instance in which QVF data was incomplete and 44 (10%) clerks responded that they were aware of a recent instance in which QVF data was incomplete. Most clerks reported inaccurate and incomplete data as it related to street index, which ensures that each voter is assigned to his or her proper precinct and voting districts; inaccurate names; deceased voters; and other miscellaneous information.

- c. We asked clerks if BOE provided sufficient guidance regarding periodic voter maintenance procedures that the clerks could perform to help ensure that QVF voter data was accurate and complete. Of the total 414 clerk responses, 294 (71%) clerks responded yes, 38 (9%) clerks responded no, and 82 (20%) clerks responded that they did not know.

We noted a similar situation in our prior audit, in which we recommended that BOE should continue its efforts to work with county, city, and township clerks to improve the integrity of records contained in the QVF. In its response, BOE agreed with the recommendation and stated that it would comply by continuing to work daily with county, city, township, village, and school election officials to improve the accuracy of Michigan's voter registration records.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE provide additional direction distinguishing local-level and State-level responsibilities to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of records contained in the QVF.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees to provide additional direction that distinguishes local- and State-level responsibilities with regard to maintaining QVF records. The Department informed us that it provides extensive documentation and staff support currently to election officials Statewide to assist them in understanding their roles with respect to maintaining QVF records. The Department will agree to provide election officials with documentation that more clearly identifies that it is a local (not State) responsibility to maintain the accuracy and integrity of QVF records, and will

continue to work daily with county, city, and township election officials to assist and guide them in their efforts to improve the accuracy of their local voter registration records.

## **FINDING**

### 3. QVF Access Controls

BOE should provide additional guidance to local clerks to help strengthen QVF access controls to ensure the integrity and security of QVF records. Without adequate access controls, it is possible that unauthorized individuals, including outside intruders and former employees, could read and copy sensitive data, such as voter name, driver's license number, and date of birth, or make undetected additions or deletions that could diminish the integrity of the election process.

Section 21 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.21 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) provides that the Secretary of State shall be the chief election officer of the State and shall have supervisory control over the approximately 1,700 county and local election officials in the performance of their duties under provisions of the statute.

Section 509m(1) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.509m(1) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that the purpose of the QVF is to enhance the uniformity of the administration of elections by maintaining a Statewide file of qualified voters, to increase the efficiency and decrease the public cost of maintaining voter registration files, and to increase the integrity of the voting process by creating a single QVF that will permit the name of each citizen to appear only once in the system. Section 509o of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.509o of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that the Secretary of State shall direct and supervise the establishment and maintenance of the Statewide QVF.

Access controls restrict access or detect inappropriate access to computer resources, thereby protecting the resources from unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. Access controls require users to authenticate themselves, through the use of secret passwords or other identifiers, and limit the files and other resources that users can access and actions that they can execute.

Our survey results and review support the need for strengthened QVF access and security controls:

- a. We sent electronic surveys to 1,509 county, city, and township clerks with a BOE-assigned QVF e-mail address (see survey summary, presented as supplemental information). BOE informed us that only 890 (59%) of the 1,509 had QVF access. The survey results showed:
  - (1) Of 406 clerks, 215 (53%) responded that they do not require that their staff periodically change their QVF password.
  - (2) Of 410 clerks, 206 (50%) responded that they never change their QVF password.
  - (3) Of 408 clerks, 141 (35%) responded that they do not use password-protected screen savers.
  - (4) Of 398 clerks, 136 (34%) responded that they do not require new QVF users to acknowledge the use of confidential data and other security issues (e.g., requiring new users to read and sign user access forms).
  - (5) Of 412 clerks, 97 (24%) responded that they share their QVF username and password with other employees.
  - (6) Of 405 clerks, 37 (9%) responded that they do not remove QVF access for terminated employees.
- b. Our review disclosed additional QVF access and security issues, including:
  - (1) BOE should instruct QVF users at QVF replica site jurisdictions to change QVF passwords on a periodic basis.

All 83 counties and 296 of Michigan's largest cities and townships (those with a voting age population over 5,000) are considered QVF replica site jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have QVF installations that allow for the jurisdiction to access the QVF and provide updates to the Lansing file server through a replication process. Replication updates the Lansing

server with new information provided by the local jurisdiction and updates the local jurisdiction with new information provided by the Lansing file server. QVF replica site jurisdictions maintain the QVF for 5.7 million (78%) of the State's total 7.3 million voters.

- (2) BOE should instruct QVF replica site jurisdictions to sign user access forms to acknowledge the use of confidential data and other security issues. BOE stated that it relies on each jurisdiction to implement its own access and security measures. As demonstrated by the survey results discussed previously, access and security measures vary greatly by local jurisdiction.
- (3) BOE could not provide signed QVF "lite" user agreements for 3 (20%) of 15 requested.

BOE requires that QVF "lite" user jurisdictions complete user agreements. QVF "lite" user jurisdictions are small jurisdictions (voting age population under 5,000) that connect directly to the Lansing QVF central server, allowing the jurisdictions to access voter information for their city or township. QVF "lite" jurisdictions maintain the QVF for 750,000 (10%) of the State's total 7.3 million voters.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE provide additional guidance to local clerks to help strengthen QVF access controls to ensure the integrity and security of QVF records.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees to provide additional guidance to local clerks with regard to appropriate access controls that they must have in place. The Department informed us that it agrees to reinforce with local election officials of the need for QVF users to change passwords, that sharing passwords is prohibited, and that QVF access must be terminated immediately when an employee is separated. The Department indicated that it will also reinforce with local election officials that they are responsible for the security of their local QVF data and that they must ensure their employees are aware of and abide by these practices. The Department

further indicated that it will also agree to require each QVF jurisdiction (replica sites as well as QVF Lite sites) to sign a QVF user agreement which includes standard State security controls as dictated by the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget.

## ADMINISTRATION OF TRAINING PROGRAMS

### COMMENT

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to administer required training programs in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA.

**Audit Conclusion:** We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in administering required training programs in compliance with the Michigan Election Law and federal HAVA. Our audit disclosed two reportable conditions related to training and accreditation programs (Findings 4 and 5).

### FINDING

#### 4. Training

BOE should enhance controls to further promote compliance with the Michigan Election Law regarding training of election officials, training coordinators, and election precinct inspectors.

Section 21 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.21 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) provides that the Secretary of State shall be the chief election officer of the State and shall have supervisory control over the approximately 1,700 county and local election officials in the performance of their duties under provisions of the statute.

Our review of the training of election officials, election precinct inspector training coordinators, and election precinct inspectors disclosed:

- a. BOE should enhance its process to identify and document that all county clerks have obtained accreditation status. Also, BOE should implement a process to identify and document all other election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators that required training. Without a

comprehensive list, BOE cannot determine whether it has a responsibility under Section 33(3) of the Michigan Election Law to conduct election precinct inspector training in counties where the clerk has not been accredited to conduct training schools. Also, without a comprehensive list, BOE is unable to determine which, if any, election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators lack training as required by Section 31(1)(j) and Section 33(2) of the Michigan Election Law. A comprehensive list would allow BOE to notify individual election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators of their training status and specifically require that individual to attend training, if needed.

Effective March 31, 1997, Section 31(1)(j) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.31(1)(j) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires the Secretary of State to establish a curriculum for comprehensive training and accreditation of all county, city, township, village, and school election officials. Also, Section 33(2) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.33(2) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires BOE to train all county, city, and township clerks who are involved in the training of election precinct inspectors. In addition, Section 33(3) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.33(3) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires that BOE conduct all precinct inspector training in counties where the clerk has not been accredited to conduct training schools.

Although BOE maintains a database that contains election official attendance records for BOE accreditation training sessions, BOE does not have a process in place to compare the attendance records to a master list to determine which, if any, election officials are lacking accreditation status.

Our review of all 83 current county clerks disclosed that 2 (2%) county clerks had not received clerk accreditation status as required by Section 31(1)(j) of the Michigan Election Law and that 28 (34%) county clerks had not attended election precinct inspector coordinator training as required by Sections 33(2) and 33(3) of the Michigan Election Law. Our review of 40 randomly selected city, township, and village clerks disclosed that 1 (3%) clerk had not received clerk accreditation status as required by Section 31(1)(j) of the Michigan Election Law.

In addition, a comprehensive list would help ensure that newly appointed or elected election officials attend an initial course of instruction within six months before the date of an election as required by Section 31(1)(k) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.31(1)(k) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*).

Although the *Michigan Compiled Laws* do not specifically require BOE to identify and document all election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators, such a process would help to ensure that those charged with administering elections are adequately trained, which in turn enhances the integrity of the election process.

- b. BOE should implement controls to further promote compliance with the Michigan Election Law regarding election precinct inspector training requirements.

Section 683 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.683 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that a person must either receive election training or pass an election examination within the two years preceding an election to serve as an election precinct inspector. County and local election officials train election precinct inspectors, but BOE did not monitor training records to ensure that inspectors met training requirements prior to serving on an election. This form of monitoring could be achieved through a variety of methods, such as a sample-based or a risk-based approach.

Although the Michigan Election Law did not specifically require that BOE monitor the training records of election officials and election precinct inspectors, we believe that such a process is warranted because of BOE's supervisory responsibility and the importance of training in the election process. To support the importance of such monitoring, our survey of all county, city, and township clerks showed that 18 clerks responded that they did not track election inspector training.

Even though BOE does not have an express legal duty to monitor training records, such monitoring would help to ensure that election precinct inspectors obtain the training necessary to deal with the various issues confronting them on election day and to help ensure the integrity of the election process.

We noted a similar situation in our prior audit pertaining to ensuring that election precinct inspectors met the necessary training requirements prior to serving on an election. In its response, BOE agreed to comply with the recommendation pursuant to the Michigan Election Law.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE enhance controls to further promote compliance with the Michigan Election Law regarding training of election officials, training coordinators, and election precinct inspectors.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees to further promote and communicate with election officials of the need to comply with mandated training requirements. The Department indicated that it agrees to continue to reinforce both State- and local-level training requirements to all election officials, and agrees to conduct more detailed and ongoing tracking to identify and communicate with election officials that have not attended statutorily-required training. The Department's planned on-line training Web site (currently in pilot mode but will be available Statewide later this summer) will provide a multitude of additional on-line training programs for clerks, and will include an automated appointment and tracking function for both on-line and in-person training programs. The Department contends that election directors, deputy clerks, and other election officials appointed by the clerk may attend required "train the trainer" training schools on the clerk's/jurisdiction's behalf to meet statutory requirements. The Department stated that it does not agree to track election precinct inspector training records, as conducting precinct inspector training is a local, not State, responsibility. The Department informed us that the Secretary of State is also seeking audit authority to inspect records of local election officials, which would include training records, via a bill currently before the Michigan Legislature.

### **FINDING**

#### **5. Accreditation Programs**

BOE needs to improve its efforts related to election official and election precinct inspector training coordinator accreditation programs.

Section 21 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.21 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) provides that the Secretary of State shall be the chief election officer of the State and shall have supervisory control over local election officials in the performance of their duties under provisions of the statute. Our review of the training of election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators disclosed:

- a. BOE's clerk accreditation program should be expanded to include continuing training of all election officials. Continuing training would help ensure that election officials are adequately trained with respect to changes in the Michigan Election Law and trending election issues, such as the voter identification requirements implemented beginning with the November 6, 2007 election and the federal Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act) that was passed by Congress in 2009.

Section 31 of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.31 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires the Secretary of State to establish a curriculum for comprehensive training and accreditation of all county, city, township, village, and school election officials.

BOE's clerk accreditation program requires that election officials attend a two-day training session offered by BOE; study the information presented in the election officials' accreditation study guide; and complete and submit a self-administered accreditation examination. An election official receives notification of accreditation status from BOE when these requirements are met, including passing the examination with a score of 70% or higher.

BOE offered a variety of periodic continuing training opportunities to election officials; however, BOE did not require that election officials attend continuing training to maintain their accreditation status. Our review of all 83 county clerks disclosed that 58 (70%) county clerks received their clerk accreditation status in 2002 or 2003. Although election officials may have attended some training since the time of their accreditation, BOE's clerk accreditation program did not require election officials to do so.

- b. BOE should establish an accreditation program for election precinct inspector training coordinators. An accreditation program should allow election precinct inspector training coordinators to demonstrate possession of proper skills and knowledge, to obtain an official accreditation status, and to receive continuing training.

Section 33(2) of the Michigan Election Law (Section 168.33(2) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires BOE to train all county, city, and township clerks who are involved in the training of precinct inspectors. In addition, Section 33(3) requires that BOE conduct all precinct inspector training in counties where the clerk has not been accredited to conduct the training schools.

BOE provides training to election precinct inspector training coordinators through its Train the Trainer sessions, which are held regionally every two years. The Train the Trainer session is a mixture of lecture and hands-on exercises that correspond to a training manual and workbook. Upon receiving this training from BOE, election precinct inspector training coordinators are then responsible for conducting training on election day duties to approximately 30,000 election inspectors.

BOE stated that it considered an individual to be an accredited training coordinator if the individual attended a Train the Trainer session. Our review of all 83 county clerks showed that 28 (34%) county clerks had not yet attended BOE's Train the Trainer session. According to its definition of accreditation, BOE is responsible for conducting precinct inspector training in the State's 28 counties as required by Section 33(3) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*.

We noted a similar situation in our prior audit. BOE had not implemented training and accreditation programs for election officials and election precinct inspector training coordinators. In its response, BOE stated that it would comply with the recommendation pursuant to the Michigan Election Law.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE improve its efforts related to election official and election precinct inspector training coordinator accreditation programs.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees to increase its efforts with respect to election official training programs. The Department informed us that while it recognizes that there is no legal requirement to provide continuous accreditation training, the Department supports the concept of ongoing education and will continue to provide election officials Statewide with a variety of ongoing continuing education opportunities. The Department informed us that the Bureau of Elections maintains a full curriculum of regular training programs for local election officials. The Department will agree to inform election officials that they are required to participate in ongoing education and will communicate these requirements to election officials on an ongoing basis. The Department also informed us that it is currently supporting a bill in the Legislature mandating ongoing accreditation by local election officials. The Department will also agree to develop an accreditation program for election precinct inspector training coordinators. The Department contends that election directors, deputy clerks, and other election officials appointed by the clerk may attend required train the trainer training schools on the clerk's/jurisdiction's behalf to meet statutory requirements. Similar to the Department's response to the prior audit, the Department informed us that it will continue to comply with recommendations that are required by Michigan Election Law and will undertake further enhancements as identified above in this response.

## **COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS**

### **COMMENT**

**Background:** The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) requires candidate committees and various other committees to periodically file campaign financial reports (e.g., statements of contributions and expenditures) with BOE. The MCFA requires that each committee keep detailed records and receipts to substantiate the information contained in the reports filed; however, the Act does not give BOE the express authority to obtain the detailed records to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the reports.

The Lobby Act was enacted to provide public disclosure of the activities of persons who attempt to influence the actions of State-level public officials who might be lobbied. The Lobby Act requires persons to register as lobbyists or lobbyist agents when they make expenditures or receive compensation or reimbursement for lobbying activities in excess of the thresholds specified by the Act.

The Casino Interest Registration Act requires persons who have casino interests to file a registration with the Secretary of State. BOE prepares a summary of the registrations for public dissemination. In addition, BOE and the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB), Department of Treasury, have entered into an agreement to monitor prohibited contributions to candidates or political party committees made by persons who have an interest in a casino license or a casino enterprise.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness of BOE's efforts to comply with reporting and disclosure requirements of the MCFA, Lobby Act, and Casino Interest Registration Act.

**Audit Conclusion:** We concluded that BOE's efforts were moderately effective in complying with reporting and disclosure requirements of the MCFA, Lobby Act, and Casino Interest Registration Act. Our audit disclosed three reportable conditions related to MCFA statement and report review timeliness, monitoring of contributions, and Casino Interest Registration Act reporting and notification (Findings 6 through 8).

## **FINDING**

### 6. Michigan Campaign Finance Act Statement and Report Review Timeliness

BOE's efforts did not ensure compliance with the timeliness requirement established by Section 16 of the MCFA (Section 169.216(6) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) in its review of campaign statements and reports.

Under the MCFA, BOE received campaign finance disclosure statements and reports from the committees of all individuals who are candidates for State-level offices and all judicial offices. Section 16 of the MCFA (Section 169.216(6) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) requires BOE to determine whether a statement or report filed under the MCFA complied, on its face, with the requirements of the MCFA and the rules promulgated under the MCFA. The Section required that BOE give notice to filers by registered mail of an error or omission in the statement or report within four business days after the deadline for filing a statement or report.

BOE did not complete its review of campaign statements and reports within four business days after the deadline for filing the statement or report. As a result, BOE did not detect errors or omissions on campaign statements and reports in a timely manner. Without timely identification and correction of errors and omissions, the public may not have access to relevant and accurate campaign finance statements and reports.

Our review disclosed that BOE did not review 9,012 (84%) of the total 10,672 original statements and reports submitted during the audit period within four business days of the filing deadline. On average, it took BOE 42 business days to review original campaign statements and reports during the audit period. Although BOE's electronic filing process prevents filers from submitting incomplete reports, BOE did not perform its detailed review of campaign statements and reports within four business days as required by the MCFA.

BOE stated that it was unable to meet the timeliness requirement because of the large volume of statements and reports in comparison to its small staff size. For example, BOE stated that it received 3,889 and 11,319 original and amended campaign statements and reports for calendar years 2009 and 2010, respectively. However, BOE stated that it only employed 1 to 3 full-time analysts during the audit period.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE improve its efforts to ensure compliance with the timeliness requirement established by Section 16 of the MCFA (Section 169.216(6) of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) in its review of campaign statements and reports.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees that it cannot realistically meet the mandated four business day review requirement established by the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. The Department indicated that it feels it is highly unlikely to obtain approval for staffing increases that would allow for full review within the timeframes required, and will work to improve and possibly meet legal requirements through further process automation and by seeking legislative change.

## **FINDING**

### **7. Monitoring of Contributions**

BOE should revise its memorandum of understanding with MGCB to define each party's specific responsibilities to monitor for prohibited contributions by persons with casino interests.

Section 30 of the MCFA states that a committee shall not knowingly maintain a contribution received from a person who is prohibited from making a contribution under Section 7b of the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA) (Section 432.207b of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*). Section 7b prohibits contributions to a candidate or committee by persons who are licensees or a person who has an interest in a licensee or a casino enterprise during specified time periods.

A memorandum of understanding between the Department and MGCB was established in 2000 to set forth the agreement regarding the exchange of information concerning prohibited contributions received by committees regulated by the MCFA in violation of the MGCRA. According to the memorandum of understanding, BOE and MGCB are to work cooperatively in the exchange of information regarding contributions to committees by persons who have an interest in a casino license or a casino enterprise.

Since 2007, BOE has not performed any procedures to identify prohibited contributions from persons holding a casino interest. In previous years, BOE provided MGCB with electronic files of campaign contributions and requested MGCB to provide BOE with confirmation of prohibited contributions. However, BOE stated that it discontinued this practice because MGCB did not provide positive confirmation. BOE stated that the last electronic file was provided to MGCB in 2007.

In our prior audit of BOE issued in February 2003, we recommended that the memorandum of understanding be revised to include specific control procedures to monitor for prohibited contributions by persons with casino interests. In BOE's response, it agreed with the recommendation and indicated that it would work with MGCB to develop an electronic matching process and revise the memorandum of understanding accordingly. While BOE has demonstrated its attempts to revise the

memorandum of understanding with MGCB, the memorandum has not yet been revised. Without specific control procedures, BOE and MGCB cannot ensure compliance with the provisions of the MCFA and the MGCRA.

After the completion of our audit fieldwork, BOE and MGCB revised their memorandum of understanding.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that BOE revise its memorandum of understanding with MGCB to define each party's specific responsibilities to monitor for prohibited contributions by persons with casino interests.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees and has finalized a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB). The Department informed us that the MOU, which was signed and put into place by both agencies in March 2012, defines each party's specific responsibilities.

### **FINDING**

#### **8. Casino Interest Registration Act Reporting and Notification**

BOE did not ensure that casino interest registration forms were complete. Also, BOE did not directly notify persons who failed to register as holding a casino interest.

Our review disclosed:

- a. BOE did not directly notify persons who failed to register as holding a casino interest. As a result, we determined that BOE had assessed 27 late registration fees during the audit period; however, all 27 (100%) assessed fees remain outstanding.

Section 3 of the Casino Interest Registration Act (Section 432.273 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*) states that a person who fails to register within five days after obtaining a casino interest shall pay a late registration fee. Also, if

the person fails to register for more than 30 days, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than \$1,000.

Our review disclosed that it was BOE's practice to notify the associated casino of the individual's late registration fee, rather than the registered individual.

- b. BOE accepted as filed casino interest registration forms that were missing information.

*Michigan Administrative Code R 432.1002* states that the Department of State shall not accept or consider as filed a casino interest registration that is not complete. Also, a person filing a casino interest registration shall complete each item of information requested or shall clearly note that the item of information is not applicable.

Of the 90 casino interest registration forms submitted during the audit period, our review of 10 forms showed that 1 (10%) form was not complete. The registration form was missing the date that the individual acquired the casino interest. BOE did not request this missing information from the individual. This date is critical for BOE to determine if the individual complied with Section 432.273 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws*, which requires an individual to register not later than five days after obtaining a casino interest.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that BOE ensure that casino interest registration forms are complete.

We also recommend that BOE directly notify persons who failed to register as holding a casino interest.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

The Department agrees and will comply. BOE agrees to request missing required information in writing. The Department indicated that it has prepared and sent letters to the Casinos and the respective employees with outstanding fees and will refer any Casino and filer that has not remitted payment timely to the Department of Treasury for collection. The Department informed us that all future notices will be in writing and will be addressed to the registrant specifically.

# SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BUREAU OF ELECTIONS (BOE)

Department of State

Survey Summary

Summary Overview:

The Qualified Voter File (QVF) system uses the Internet as its telecommunications network. BOE provided each QVF jurisdiction with an Internet account and Internet software which includes e-mail and Web searching capabilities. We sent electronic surveys to 1,509 county, city, and township clerks included on BOE's list of QVF e-mail addresses. We received 473 responses to our survey, a response rate of 31%.

Following is a summary of the survey that includes the number of responses received for each item. The total number of responses for each item may not agree with the number of responses reported in the preceding paragraph because some respondents provided more than one response to an item and other respondents did not answer all items or were not required to answer all items.

**Background Information**

1. Are you a county, city, or township clerk?

- a. 55 County
- b. 118 City
- c. 300 Township

2. How long have you served as a clerk (please select the most appropriate response)?

- a. 19 Less than 1 year
- b. 129 1 year to 5 years
- c. 111 More than 5 years to 10 years
- d. 99 More than 10 years to 15 years
- e. 115 More than 15 years

3. Please indicate the response that best describes your county, city, or township voting age population:

- a. 255 Less than or equal to 4,999
- b. 145 Between 5,000 and 24,999
- c. 30 Between 25,000 and 49,999
- d. 24 Between 50,000 and 99,999
- e. 16 Greater than or equal to 100,000

## Training

4. Which of the following training sessions have you attended in the last three years (please select all responses that apply)?
- a. 264 Clerk Accreditation
  - b. 278 Qualified Voter File (QVF)
  - c. 126 Train the Trainer
  - d. 275 Election Cycle County-by-County Training
  - e. 49 Mock Recount/Recounts
  - f. 122 Receiving Boards
  - g. 278 E-Pollbook
  - h. 20 I have not attended training in the last three years.
5. If you have not attended training in the last three years, select the statements that describe the reasons why you did not attend training (please select all responses that apply):
- a. 5 Training was not provided at a convenient time.
  - b. 5 Training was not provided at a convenient location.
  - c. 4 Budgetary constraints prevented my attendance.
  - d. 4 My staff and/or assistants attended training on my behalf.
  - e. 1 I did not feel that the training was beneficial.
  - f. 1 Training was not offered.
  - g. 2 I do not need additional training.
  - h. 6 Other (must describe)
6. Please select the option that best describes your satisfaction with the training you received from the Bureau of Elections:
- a. 177 Very satisfied
  - b. 220 Satisfied
  - c. 46 Somewhat satisfied
  - d. 5 Unsatisfied
  - e. 0 Very unsatisfied
  - f. 3 I did not receive training.
7. Do you feel that the "Train the Trainer" sessions provide you with adequate skills and knowledge to properly train your election inspectors?
- a. 63 Strongly agree
  - b. 125 Agree
  - c. 5 Disagree
  - d. 0 Strongly disagree
  - e. 258 I have not attended "Train the Trainer" sessions.

8. How do you track your election inspectors' training attendance (please select all responses that apply)?
- a. 272 Retention of training sign-in sheet(s)
  - b. 117 Spreadsheet(s)
  - c. 71 Qualified Voter File (QVF)
  - d. 18 Election inspectors' training attendance is not tracked.
  - e. 129 Other (please describe)
9. Have you attended the Bureau of Elections' clerk accreditation training?
- 447 Yes    21 No
10. How long ago did you attend the Bureau of Elections' clerk accreditation training?
- a. 88 2 years ago or less
  - b. 150 More than 2 years ago to 4 years ago
  - c. 96 More than 4 years ago to 6 years ago
  - d. 107 More than 6 years ago
11. Did you receive confirmation of your clerk accreditation status?
- a. 392 Yes
  - b. 7 No
  - c. 36 I do not know.
  - d. 4 Not applicable
12. In which areas do you feel additional training should be provided (please select all that apply)?
- a. 111 Voter registration
  - b. 81 Mail-in registration forms
  - c. 85 Absentee ballots
  - d. 161 Election day issues
  - e. 91 Appointing and training election inspectors
  - f. 71 Voting equipment
  - g. 88 Vote fraud awareness
  - h. 183 I feel that existing training is sufficient.
  - i. 77 Other (please describe)
13. Please select the option that best describes your overall experience with the Bureau of Elections in meeting your training needs:
- a. 139 Very satisfied
  - b. 256 Satisfied
  - c. 55 Somewhat satisfied
  - d. 8 Unsatisfied
  - e. 0 Very unsatisfied
  - f. 6 No opinion

14. Please select the statement(s) that best describes why you are not completely satisfied with your overall experience with the Bureau of Elections in meeting your training needs (please select all responses that apply):
- a. 27 Training sessions were not provided frequently enough to meet my training needs.
  - b. 27 Training sessions were not provided at a geographically accessible location.
  - c. 10 Training opportunities were not communicated to me.
  - d. 13 Training opportunities were not communicated in a timely manner.
  - e. 28 Other (please describe)

**Qualified Voter File (QVF)**

15. How do you access the QVF?
- a. 246 Original QVF site (replica site)
  - b. 162 QVF Lite user site (access the QVF directly over the Internet)
  - c. 18 I do access the QVF, but I do not know which method I use to access the QVF.
  - d. 37 I do not have access to the QVF.
16. Does the QVF have all the features and capabilities that you require to perform your voter file and related job responsibilities?
- 373 Yes    53 No
17. Has the QVF provided you with access to the data you need to perform your job responsibilities?
- 412 Yes    14 No
18. Do you use other voter file systems or databases to process voter data in conjunction with the QVF?
- 106 Yes    320 No
19. Does election law require you to use registration data in a way that is not currently being provided for in the QVF?
- 23 Yes    368 No
20. Are you aware of any recent instance(s) in which QVF data was inaccurate?
- 81 Yes    343 No
21. Are you aware of any recent instance(s) in which QVF data was incomplete?
- 44 Yes    379 No

22. How often is the QVF unavailable for use?
- a. 31 Often
  - b. 27 Sometimes
  - c. 319 Rarely
  - d. 40 Never
23. Does the Bureau of Elections provide sufficient guidance regarding periodic voter maintenance procedures that you could perform to help ensure that QVF voter data is accurate and complete?
- a. 294 Yes
  - b. 38 No
  - c. 82 I do not know.
24. Please select the statement below that best describes your responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of QVF data:
- a. 171 I am fully responsible for my jurisdiction's data.
  - b. 181 I share responsibility for my jurisdiction's data with the Bureau of Elections.
  - c. 22 I am not at all responsible for my jurisdiction's data.
  - d. 40 I do not know.
25. How often do you use the QVF?
- a. 152 At least every day
  - b. 173 At least every week
  - c. 71 At least every month
  - d. 11 At least every two months
  - e. 5 At least every six months
  - f. 5 At least once a year
  - g. 5 I have never used the QVF.
26. What is your reason(s) for not using the QVF more often (please select all responses that apply)?
- a. 9 My job only requires me to access the QVF that often.
  - b. 0 The QVF does not contain the information I need.
  - c. 7 I can obtain the information I need from other sources.
  - d. 2 I do not know how to use the QVF.
  - e. 12 Other (please describe)
27. Do you use password-protected screen savers?
- 267 Yes    141 No

28. How often do you change your QVF password (please select the most appropriate response)?
- |    |            |                         |
|----|------------|-------------------------|
| a. | <u>5</u>   | At least every 30 days  |
| b. | <u>28</u>  | At least every 60 days  |
| c. | <u>52</u>  | At least every 90 days  |
| d. | <u>63</u>  | At least every year     |
| e. | <u>206</u> | Never                   |
| f. | <u>56</u>  | Other (please describe) |
29. Do you share your QVF user name and password with any other employees?
- |           |     |            |    |
|-----------|-----|------------|----|
| <u>97</u> | Yes | <u>315</u> | No |
|-----------|-----|------------|----|
30. Do you require other QVF users to periodically change QVF passwords?
- |    |            |  |
|----|------------|--|
| a. | <u>73</u>  | Yes  |
| b. | <u>215</u> | No   |
| c. | <u>118</u> | Not applicable (i.e., that decision is outside of my job responsibility) |
31. Do you remove QVF access for terminated employees?
- |    |            |  |
|----|------------|--|
| a. | <u>232</u> | Yes  |
| b. | <u>37</u>  | No   |
| c. | <u>136</u> | Not applicable (i.e., that decision is outside of my job responsibility) |
32. Do you require new QVF users to acknowledge the use of confidential data and other security issues (e.g., do you require new users to read and sign user access forms)?
- |    |            |  |
|----|------------|--|
| a. | <u>121</u> | Yes  |
| b. | <u>136</u> | No   |
| c. | <u>141</u> | Not applicable (i.e., that decision is outside of my job responsibility) |
33. Please select the option that best describes your satisfaction with the QVF training you received from the Bureau of Elections:
- |    |            |                             |
|----|------------|-----------------------------|
| a. | <u>106</u> | Very satisfied              |
| b. | <u>223</u> | Satisfied                   |
| c. | <u>45</u>  | Somewhat satisfied          |
| d. | <u>7</u>   | Unsatisfied                 |
| e. | <u>2</u>   | Very unsatisfied            |
| f. | <u>31</u>  | I did not receive training. |

# GLOSSARY

## Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

BOE	Bureau of Elections.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical with the minimum amount of resources.
election precinct inspectors	Individuals meeting election training requirements who are responsible for maintaining order at the polls and enforcing lawful directions throughout the course of an election.
election precinct inspector training coordinators	County, city, and township clerks who are involved with the training of election precinct inspectors.
goal	An intended outcome of a program or an agency to accomplish its mission.
HAVA	Help America Vote Act.
internal control	The plan, policies, methods, and procedures adopted by management to meet its mission, goals, and objectives. Internal control includes the processes for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling program operations. It includes the systems for measuring, reporting, and monitoring program performance. Internal control serves as a defense in safeguarding assets and in preventing and detecting errors; fraud; violations of laws, regulations, and provisions of contracts and grant agreements; or abuse.

MCFA	Michigan Campaign Finance Act.
MGCB	Michigan Gaming Control Board.
MGCRA	Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act.
mission	The main purpose of a program or an agency or the reason that the program or the agency was established.
motor/voter	A process by which persons who are eligible are given the opportunity to register to vote or change their voter addresses when they conduct business with the Secretary of State relating to motor vehicles or personal identification cards.
MOU	memorandum of understanding.
Offender Management Network Information (OMNI)	A prisoner management system responsible for parolee case management and referral of services.
outcome	An actual impact of a program or an agency.
output	A product or a service produced by a program or an agency.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve program operations, to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action, and to improve public accountability.
QVF	Qualified Voter File.

reportable condition

A matter that, in the auditor's judgment, is less severe than a material condition and falls within any of the following categories: an opportunity for improvement within the context of the audit objectives; a deficiency in internal control that is significant within the context of the objectives of the audit; all instances of fraud; illegal acts unless they are inconsequential within the context of the audit objectives; significant violations of provisions of contracts or grant agreements; and significant abuse that has occurred or is likely to have occurred.









